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THE FUNCTION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
LEONARD G. IRATNER t
One function of the American Constitution is to provide written
evidence of the limitations upon official authority and majority control.
Whether written or unwritten, restraints on democratic government
necessarily reflect predominant community conceptions of the relation-
ship between governor and governed. But unwritten restraints tend
to be less discernible and less dependable; their protean contours more
readily conform to current majority inclination, and enforcement re-
sponsibility, if assigned, connotes an indeterminate discretion to limit
regulatory policy. Community cohesiveness is more effectively pro-
moted by an authoritative document that provides an accepted frame
of reference and an overt symbol of common goals.
The written word, fashioned in the mold of a particular time and
place, is less flexible than unwritten tradition; yet the writing must
communicate to successive generations standards responsive to chang-
ing community needs. Such communication is facilitated by the in-
herent ambiguity of language, an ambiguity resulting from tension
between the sifting, organizing generality of words and the uniqueness
of events. Resolution of that ambiguity varies with each communi-
catee's experience and with his perception of the social and psycho-
logical context that envelops communication. Constitutional phrases
are construed and applied by each generation in the context of existing
attitudes and needs. Continuity results from the generational overlap
and from the indispensable role of past experience in resolving present
problems.
Although they cannot alone define underlying goals or values, the
ambiguous constitutional statements do not lack significance. They
are starting points for thinking about governmental function. To-
gether they outline a plan of government. They identify areas of
community concern and indicate the direction of resolution. In this
sense they suggest important community values that more fully emerge
in the solution of specific problems; ' they are constitutional sources of
such values. By contrast, values not suggested by the language of the
Constitution are necessarily derived from nonconstitutional, natural
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1 Values are discussed in the text at notes 157-62 infra.
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law sources; that is, from an appraisal of community structure, tradi-
tion, and needs.'
Perhaps the most ambiguous statement in the Constitution is the
admonition of the fifth and fourteenth amendments that neither federal
nor state government shall "deprive anvperson of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." ' "Life. liberty, and property"
encompass all human activity; "law" encompasses all governmentally
enforced community values; and "due process" suggests inchoate re-
strictions on methods of enforcemei+ "
It has long since been demonstrated that the phrase "due process
of law" is a variation of Magna Carta's "according to the law of the
land," which restricted the enforcement procedures available to English
monarchs.4 But for three quarters of a century the due process clause
has been judicially employed as a constitutional reservoir of values to
support a broad spectrum of limitations upon conduct-regulating as
well as enforcement policies ' of state and national governments.' The
identifying characteristics of the favored values remain indistinct. The
Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the constitutional function
of the clause: the distinctive values that underlie it, the implications
of those values, their significance to the constitutional plan, their re-
lationship to other values, and the role of the judiciary in their
implementation.
The clause is not necessarily either an authorization for judicial
balancing of the individual's "natural rights" 7 against the social
benefits of regulation, or no more than a recapitulation of important
Bill of Rights protections, although such a polarity pervades recent
2 Natural law, as used herein, refers to societal, not transcendental, values. For
a discussion of the several connotations of natural law see 19 ENCYcLOPEDIA AMERI-
CANA 768-69 (1964) ; 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SocIA. SCrENCES 284 (1933).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V:
"[Nior shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. .. ."
4 Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HAmv.
L. REv. 366, 368-70 (1911); see E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 90-91
(1948); Mcllwain, Dite Process of Law in Magna Carta, 14 CoLum. L. Rtv. 27
(1914).
5 Enforcement policies underlie the institutional procedures for resolving public
and private disputes, including adjudication and ancillary seizure of person or prop-
erty. See text accompanying note 76 infra. Conduct-regulating policies generally un-
derlie the other governmental controls on behavior, not excluding taxes (which restrict
consumption and investment) and spending (which promotes or controls individual
activity). Policies that underlie the structure of governmental institutions may some-
times constitute a separate category. See text accompanying note 273 infra.
6 See cases cited note 13 infra.
7 Natural rights, derived from natural law values, are tentative identifications of
nonregulable individual activities. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. See also
11 ExcYcI.opiA OF SocLr ScImcCEs 299 (1933).
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judicial pronouncements on "substantive" due process." The broad
view is not consistent with the constitutional plan of written limita-
tions, nor with the role of the judiciary as interpreter of those limita-
tions; the narrow view disregards the philosophy of government that
pervades the plan.' That philosophy, reflected by the ninth amend-
ment's acknowledgment of residual rights as well as by the due process
clause, suggests a social purpose limitation on government, requiring
not public gain heavier than private detriment, but a regulatory purpose
that reflects recognizable community values and a regulatory method
that intrudes on individual choice no more than necessary to implement
the purpose.
Such a due process limitation joins legislature and judiciary in
a cooperative search for effective methods of accommodating regulatory
goals with individual autonomy. The judiciary reviews the alignment
of regulatory purpose with recognizable community values, the imple-
mentation of that purpose by the regulatory method, and the restrictive-
ness, effectiveness, and cost of formal and non-formal alternative
methods. The limitation subjects state or federal government to consti-
tutional restraints on the other when the values underlying a restriction
on one government are implemented by application of that restriction to
both. It denies social purpose to regulatory goals that contradict con-
stitutional values. It confines implementation of useful goals to
methods that minimize intrusion on constitutionally sheltered activity.
It may perhaps be judicially applied to facilitate social testing of less
intrusive methods. It prefers an accommodation of competing con-
stitutional values to a subordination of the "lighter" one.
In addition, judicial litigation expertise and the context of "due
process" suggest judicial authority to derive from the process of
adjudication fair trial requisites not included in the Bill of Rights, a
function resembling statutory interpretation and common law develop-
ment. But constitutionally authorized fair trial values must be accom-
modated with other social purposes that sometimes underlie litigation
procedures.
DUE PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL VALUES: THE NATURAL
RIGHTS LIMITATION
The social compact postulate, that government as the agent of
the governed may not deprive its principal of natural rights,'0 led the
United States Supreme Court and many state courts to the early
position that all governmental authority is limited by principles
S The due process limitation on conduct-regulating policy is commonly referred to
as "substantive." See note 4 supra; notes 14-29 infra and accompanying text.
9 See text preceding note 129 infra.
10 See notes 2, 7 supra.
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judicially derived from the nature of society."I The judicial power
thus asserted was no less than the authority to articulate and enforce
limitations on the structure of American democracy free from legis-
lative correction and constitutional restraint.12 But the inconsistency
of such judicial discretion with the constitutional plan of written re-
straints led the courts to perceive the due process clauses of state and
federal constitutions as the embodiment of natural law limitations upon
governmental policy.13
Many judicially developed due process limitations have reflected
values underlying other constitutional provisions, such as the predict-
ability-antiretroactivity values implicit in the impairment of contract,
eminent domain, ex post facto, and bill of attainder clauses. 4 First
amendment speech values are in fact reflected by decisions enforcing a
due process natural right to conduct or attend private schools and to
teach or be taught foreign languages. 5 But nonconstitutional sources
have generated such due process natural rights as protection of
economic bargaining power, labeled "freedom of contract," "6 and
lSee Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 87 (1810) ; Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815) ; E. CoR-
wIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 10-67 (1948) ; Corwin, The "Higher Law" Back-
ground of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARv. L. Rxv. 365, 381-409 (1929);
Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MIcH. L. REv. 247
(1914).12 See authorities cited note 11 supra.
13 See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) ; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 (1897); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) ; Wynhammer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856) (dictum);
E. Coawin, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 89, 103-15 (1948) ; Corwin, supra note 4,
24 HARv. L. REv. pts. 1 & 2, 366, 460.
14 See FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958) ; Perry v. United States,
294 U.S. 330 (1935) ; Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) ; Coolidge v. Long,
282 U.S. 582 (1931); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927); Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) ; Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148 (1913) ;
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) ; Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897); Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat) 19 (1827); Wynhammer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); Taylor v.
Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. 1843); North Carolina v. Foy, 2 Hayw. 310 (N.C. 1804);
E. CORwIN, supra note 11; THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 301 (Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madi-
son): "Bills of attainder, ex-post-facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of
contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact . . . ."; C. WAR-
REN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 552-56 (1928) ; Greenblatt, .Tdicial Linta-
tions on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. L. REv. 540 (1956); Hochman, The
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Hiv. L. REv.
692 (1960); Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive
Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 216 (1960); Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested
Rights, 5 Tsx. L. REv. 231 (1927) ; cf. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403
(1896) ; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet) 380, 681, 685-86 (1829).
'5 See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
286 U.S. 510 (1925) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
'6 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905) ; Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) ; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S.
1 (1915); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525 (1923); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); Ribnik v.
McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) ; Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) ;
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Morehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
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enforcement of contracts in accordance with the law of the territory
where "made." 17
The Supreme Court has not abandoned the position that the due
process clause empowers the judiciary to impose nonconstitutional,
natural law limitations upon the conduct-regulating and enforcement
authority of federal and state governments. After concluding that
impairment of the sanctified freedom of contract value could sometimes
be "outweighed" by the social benefits ensuing from exercise of the
"police power," 18 the Court moved on to divest that value of its
privileged constitutional position,'" and repudiated territoriality as a
constitutionally compelled choice-of-law standard."0 The cases marking
the course of the desanctification contain strong language indicating
that due process limitations on conduct-regulating authority were
to be derived only from the Constitution and no longer from non-
constitutional sources.
[T]he only constitutional . . . restraints which respondents
have suggested for the invalidation of legislation [controlling
employment agency charges] are those notions of public
policy embedded in earlier decisions of this Court but which,
as Mr. Justice Holmes long admonished, should not be read
into the Constitution,
said Justice Douglas for the entire Court in Olsen v. Nebraska; 2
[s]ince they do not find expression in the Constitution, we
cannot give them continuing vitality as standards by which
the constitutionality of the economic and social programs of
the states is to be determined. 2
17 See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebling, 259 U.S. 209 (1922);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
18 First, when the regulation concerned business "clothed with a public interest";
then, when it concerned any economic enterprise. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1876). See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Wolff Packing Co. v.
Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522 (1923). For a discussion of police power, see the text
at notes 132-33 infra.
19 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v..
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond
Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) ; Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421
(1952) ; see Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process
of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 13, 226 (1958).
2 0 Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943) ; Watson v. Employers
Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
21 Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236,
246-47 (1941).
22 Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Upon upholding a state right-to-work law in Lincoln Federal Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.," Justice Black emphasized
for the majority that
states have power to legislate against what are found to be
injurious practices in their internal commercial and business
affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific
federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal
law. 
2 4
But while demoting freedom of contract, the Court has reiterated
its authority to derive more attractive due process values from non-
constitutional sources.
If due process bars Congress from enactments that shock
the sense of fair play-which is the essence of due process-
one is entitled to ask whether it is not beyond the power of
Congress to deport an alien who was duped into joining the
Communist Party . . . . [a] nd this because deportation may
. . . deprive a man "of all that makes life worth living."
wrote Justice Frankfurter for a majority, in Galvan v. Press,25 that
nevertheless upheld the deportation because the unlimited "political
discretion" of Congress to deport aliens "has become . . . imbedded
in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic .... "
[T]he right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the
citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law
S. .. Freedom of movement . . . was a part of our heritage
[and] is basic in our scheme of values,
said the Court in Kent v. Dulles,26 invalidating, on statutory grounds,
the denial of passports to Communists. The statement was quoted in
Apiheker v. Secretary of State 27 to support the invalidation on due
process grounds of a statute authorizing revocation of Communists'
passports. Justice Black rejected the "constitutional liberty to travel
abroad" and concurred in Aptheker on the ground that the statutory
scheme amounted to a bill of attainder, a denial of jury trial, and an
impairment of free speech 2
23 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
24 Id. at 536.
25347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
26 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958) (Douglas, J.).
27 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964) (Goldberg, J.).
28 378 U.S. 500, 518 (1964). But cf. Justice Black's acceptance of the majority
opinion in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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These statutes [forbidding interracial marriage] . . . de-
prive the Lovings [not only of equal protection of the laws but
also] of liberty without due process of law . . . . The
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the "basic civil
rights of man," fundamental to our very existence and
survival,
recently declared Chief Justice Warren for eight justices in Loving
v. Virginia.29
Reliable evidence forcibly retrieved from the stomach of a de-
fendant was excluded from a state criminal trial on due process
grounds in Rochin v. California30 because
[t]his is conduct that shocks the conscience ....
. * . Due process of law, as a historic and generative
principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining, these
standards of conduct more precisely than to say that con-
victions cannot be brought about by methods that offend "a
sense of justice." "1
Justices Black and Douglas rejected the "sense of justice" standard in
favor of a due process limitation on state authority derived from the
self-incrimination values reflected by the fifth amendment's limitation
on federal authority.as
A majority of the Court has persistently maintained that many
Bill of Rights limitations upon federal authority are also fourteenth
amendment due process limitations on state authority not because they
29388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Justice Black's concurrence in this language appears
inconsistent with his long-expressed opposition to natural rights as a source of due
process limitations. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (dissent-
ing opinion) ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964) (concurring
opinion) ; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (concurring opinion);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
30 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
31 Id. at 172-73 (Frankfurter, J.). The Court went on to say:
Use of involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal trials is constitu-
tionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliability. They are inad-
missible under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in
them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions offend
the commnity's sense of fair play and decency.
Id. at 173 (emphasis added). See also Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960);
Rodgers v. Richmond, 305 U.S. 534 (1961). More recently the Court has concluded
that all of the search and seizure and self-incrimination values of the fourth and fifth
amendments are due process values under the fourteenth amendment, thereby making
the Rochin standard superfluous when those values are present. Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But the "sense of justice"
standard has been reaffirmed in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(dictum).
32 342 U.S. 165, 174, 177 (concurring opinions).
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are in the Bill of Rights but because they are "principle[s] of justice
so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental" and therefore "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," '3 or are "basic in our system of jurisprudence," " the latest
formulation being "fundamental to the American scheme of justice
. . . necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." "
Most of the majority view the fourteenth amendment as "absorb-
ing" or "incorporating" the fundamental limitations, implying perhaps
that a presumption of fundamentalness arises from specification in the
Bill of Rights. 6 A few led by Justice Harlan insist that due process
limitations are identified not by incorporation or absorption but solely
by the Court's perception of their fundamental nature, concomitant
mention in the Bill of Rights presumably, being a not-unexpected
coincidence. 7
The difference in the two views is not entirely academic. In
recent cases the selective incorporators have expanded the funda-
mental limitation category and extended to the states every restraint on
federal authority derived from such limitations.38  The nonincor-
porators are more reluctant to discern fundamentalness, and cling to the
33 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.), quoting Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in
Due Process Adjudication--A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1958). See
also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908) ; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 535 (1884).
34 1 re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
:"Duncan v. Louisiana, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1447, 1448 n.14 (1968).
36 Cases cited note 38 infra; Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961) ; id. at 154
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1953); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) ; Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) ; Git-
low v. New York, 268 U.S. 562 (1925) ; Henkin, Selective Iiworporation in the Four-
teenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
37 Duncan v. Louisiana, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1460 (1968) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan & White,
JJ., concurring); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (Harlan, 3., con-
curring) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1964) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., con-
curring) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (Harlan & Clark, JJ., dissenting);
see Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 80 (1964) (Harlan & Clark, JJ.,
concurring); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1911) ; cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 672 (1961) (Harlan, Frankfurter, & Whittaker, JJ., dissenting).
38Duncan v. Louisiana, 88 S.Ct 1444 (1968) (sixth amendment jury trial);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (sixth amendment speedy trial);
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (application of fifth amendment self-incrimi-
nation privilege to disbarment of lawyers); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493
(1967) (application of fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege to discharge of
public employees); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (application of fifth
amendment self-incrimination privilege to prosecutor comment on failure of accused
to testify); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment confrontation
of witnesses) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment self-incrimina-
tion privilege) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment as-
sistance of counsel in non-capital cases) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclu-
sion of evidence obtained by fourth amendment unreasonable search and seizure).
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earlier view that due process tolerates non-fundamental state encroach-
ments on fundamental Bill of Rights limitations although similar
federal encroachments are proscribed.39
But the selective incorporators neither assert that every Bill of
Rights provision is automatically absorbed by the fourteenth amend-
ment nor disclaim authority to derive due process values from non-
constitutional sources. Explicitly or implicitly, they indicate that the
extended protections are fundamental and that such fundamental pro-
tections must similarly limit federal and state authority.4"
A minority led by Justice Black perceives fourteenth amendment
incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights 4 but has divided over the
derivation of additional due process protections from nonconstitutional
sources. Justices Murphy and Rutledge favored such derivation. 2
Justices Black and Douglas oppose it,43 but have accepted the "funda-
mental limitation" premise when writing for a majority in support of
extended Bill of Rights applications.4 4
Judicial authority to identify fundamental guarantees in the Bill
of Rights does not negative judicial authority to derive fundamental
guarantees from other sources. After the search and seizure and self-
incrimination values of the fourth and fifth amendments had been
recognized as fourteenth amendment due process values, a majority in
Schmerber v. California decided that police-supervised extraction of
blood from an objecting patient to prove drunkenness impaired neither
search and seizure nor self-incrimination values, "and did not offend
'that "sense of justice" ' of which we spoke in Rochin . . . . "
39 See cases cited note 37 supra. See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 88 C.St. 1444,
1459 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring) ; cases cited note 36 supra.
4 0 See cases cited note 38 supra. Justice Brennan's opinion in Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964), comes close to adopting a rationale of total incorporation but does
not do so and is illuminated by his dissenting opinion in Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S.
117, 154 (1961).
4' Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 150 (1961) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting);
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 139 (1954) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174, 177 (1952) (Black, J., and Douglas, J., con-
curring) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39, 40, 41 (1949) (Black, J., concurring;
Rutledge, Murphy, & Douglas, JJ., dissenting) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
68, 123 (1947) (Black, Douglas, Murphy, & Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).
12 See the dissents of Justices Murphy and Rutledge cited note 41 supra.
43 See the dissents and concurrences of Justices Black and Douglas cited note 41
suf'ra.
44 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (majority opinion by Douglas, J.;
Black, J., concurring) ; Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (majority opinion
by Douglas, J.; Black, J., concurring); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)
(majority opinion by Douglas, J.; Black, J., concurring) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965) (majority opinion by Black, J.; Douglas, J., concurring); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (majority opinion by Black, J.; Douglas, 3., con-
curring) ; see Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (majority opinion by
Warren, C.J.; Douglas & Black, JJ., concurring).
45 384 U.S. 757, 760 (1966).
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The terms sense of justice, fundamental principles, rights funda-
mental to the American scheme of justice, traditions and conscience of
the people, basic civil rights, fair play, concept of ordered liberty,
decency, and heritage, are modern designations for the natural rights
of man. They are labels, not standards for decision, suggesting long-
range community values perceived by the judiciary but not necessarily
reflected by the Constitution. Values thus labeled have become con-
stitutional limitations on governmental authority, apparently to be
balanced against the social benefits of regulation.
MODERN DIsSONANCE: THE Griswold CACOPHONY
The obbligato of uncertainty concerning the nature of the judicial
due process function became strident when, in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,46 the Supreme Court invalidated on due process grounds the
application to married couples of a statute that prohibited use of
contraceptives "for the purpose of preventing conception" but not of
preventing disease 47  The defendants, a physician and the Director
of the Planned Parenthood League, had aided and abetted violation
of the statute by prescribing contraceptives for married couples at a
birth control clinic.48  A majority of the Court agreed that the contra-
ceptive ban impaired a fundamental due process value, the privacy of
the marital relationship, but differed as to the source of that value.
Justices Douglas and Clark 49 located it in a constitutional "zone
of privacy" formed by "penumbras" emanating from the first, third,
fourth, and fifth amendments6 and from the ninth amendment's
declaration that "the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
46 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47 CoxN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (1958): "Any person who uses any drug,
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined
not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one
year or be both fined and imprisoned."
48 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-196 (1958): "Any person who assists, abets,
counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted
and punished as if he were the principal offender."
Defendants were accorded standing to assert the constitutional claims of their
patients because "the accessory should have standing to assert that the offense which
he is charged with assisting is not, or cannot constitutionally be, a crime," 381 U.S. at
481, and because "the rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be con-
sidered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them."
Id. But cf. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
49 Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Clark
concurred. Justices Goldberg and Brennan, and Chief Justice Warren, stated in their
concurring opinion that they joined in the opinion and judgment of the Court. 381
U.S. at 486.
60 The first amendment's protection of free speech and association, the third
amendment's proscription of uninvited peacetime quartering of soldiers, the fourth
amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the fifth
amendment's protection against compulsory self-incrimination. 381 U.S. at 484.
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shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." 4'
Justice Goldberg and two others agreed that marital privacy is a
fundamental due process value "within the protected penumbra of
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights" but reiterated that "the [due
process] concept of liberty . . is not confined to the specific terms
of the Bill of Rights" 62 and stressed the relevance of the ninth amend-
ment's preservation of rights not elsewhere enumerated, quoting in
explanation of the purpose of that amendment James Madison's state-
ment to Congress:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it
would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be
assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were
consequently insecure. . . . I conceive that it may be
guarded against. I have attempted it . . . [in] the last
clause of the fourth resolution [the ninth amendment]."
Justice Goldberg perhaps intended no more than to support the
penumbra concept by identifying the ninth amendment as a kind of
"necessary and proper clause" of the Bill of Rights, authorizing the
Court to protect constitutional values implicitly but not explicitly
designated. He said:
Nor do I mean to state that the Ninth Amendment consti-
tutes an independent source of rights protected from infringe-
ment by either the States or the Federal Government.
Rather, the Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Con-
stitution's authors that fundamental rights exist that are
not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments
654
But his later assertion that
[t]he right of privacy in the marital relation is funda-
mental and basic-a personal right "retained by the people"
within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment . . .protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by the
States 5
61 U.S. CONsT. amend. IX; see 381 U.S. at 484.
62 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., Warren, C.J., & Brennan, J., concurring).
53 Id. at 489-90; see 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNrrED STATES 626-27, 651 (5th ed. 1891).
54 381 U.S. at 492 (emphasis added).
55 Id. at 499.
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implies that the ninth amendment and the due process clause, taken
together, permit the Court to identify fundamental values not derived
from other provisions of the Constitution."'
Justice Harlan, concurring, had no doubt that the Court properly
could identify and enforce a fundamental marital privacy value without
deriving it from the Bill of Rights. He rejected the view that "the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not touch
this Connecticut statute unless the enactment is found to violate some
right assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights," '7 and
declared:
While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one
or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not
dependent on them or any of their radiations. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in
my opinion, on its own bottom. s
And Justice White, also concurring, had no difficulty in discerning,
without resort to a constitutional source, that the right of marital
intimacy, along with "the right 'to marry, establish a home, and bring
up children,' " is "among 'the basic civil liberties of man' " and entitled
to fourteenth amendment protection against regulation in the absence
of "substantial justification" by the state. 9
On the other hand, Justices Black and Stewart in dissent had
no doubt that the Constitution is the only proper source of fundamental
due process values, and they could discern no express or implied con-
stitutional recognition of the marital privacy value. Said Justice Black:
I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am never-
theless compelled to admit that government has a right to
invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional
provision.
I do not believe that we are granted power by
the Due Process Clause . . . to measure constitutionality by
our belief that legislation is arbitrary, capricious or unreason-
able, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose, or is offensive
to our own notions of "civilized standards of conduct." 60
66 The opinion further states:
The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers
of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, pro-
tected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those funda-
mental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amend-
ments.
Id. at 488.
57 Id. at 499.
N Id. at 500.
69Id. at 502.
60Id. at 510-13.
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The ninth amendment, he said,
was passed, not to broaden the powers of this Court or any
other department of "the General Government," but . . . to
assure the people that the Constitution in all its provisions
was intended to limit the Federal Government to the powers
granted expressly or by necessary implication."'
Justice Stewart added:
[W]e were told that the Connecticut law does not "conform
to current community standards." But it is not the function
of this Court to decide cases on the basis of community
standards. We are here to decide cases "agreeably to the
Constitution and laws of the United States." 62
Thus, two members of the Court firmly adhered to the view that
due process limitations on conduct-regulating authority must be
drawn from constitutional sources; (3 two members apparently took
that view; 64 two members firmly adhered to the opposite view; 65 and
three members apparently took the opposite view.66
THE JUDICIAL ROLE: LIMITATIONS ON
CONDUCT-REGULATING POLICY
The scope of judicial authority under the due process clause and
the ninth amendment to formulate limitations on federal and state
conduct-regulating policies 67 turns upon the role of the judiciary in
implementing the constitutional plan.
Common law development involves judicial identification of com-
munity goals or values and formulation of a dispute-resolving doctrine
that most effectively implements them. But such identification and
formulation are subject to prospective legislative correction.
Interpretation of a statute involves identification of its social
function, called statutory purpose. The court seeks the dispute resolu-
tion that will best implement the goals underlying a relevant statutory
statement. Effective discernment of statutory purpose requires ap-
praisal of the inevitably ambiguous language in the context of the
entire statute, its legislative history, the social setting in which it was
enacted, the social problem it was designed to resolve, and the role
61 Id. at 520.
62 Id. at 530.
03 Black & Stewart, JJ.
64 Douglas & Clark, JJ.
6 5 Harlan & White, JJ.
66 Goldberg & Brennan, JJ., & Warren, C.J.
67 See note 5 mipra.
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it has acquired in the implementation of total community policy." If
such appraisal discloses tenable, alternative purposes, the court neces-
sarily chooses the one that in its judgment best accommodates com-
munity needs. But the court's interpretation of the statute is always
subject to prospective legislative correction.
Interpreting the broadly-phrased constitutional limitations on
government is an especially creative function that requires identifica-
tion of the long-range goals of American democracy reflected by each
limitation and illumination of their significance in the resolution of
particular disputes. The context of constitutional communication in-
cludes the total constitutional plan, the enactment proceedings, the
problems of governmental structure that evoked the limitation, its
accretion of implications in response to changing social conditions,
and its acquired function in the network of existing community
arrangements.
In this role, however, the Court is not subordinate to any other
governmental institution.6 9 Constitutional limitations are most effec-
tive when enforced by an agency other than the one limited. Officials
who ultimately define the limits of their own power can disregard those
limits.70 The electorate, ordinarily concerned with more immediate
issues, is unlikely to provide political enforcement of protections claimed
by a minority. An election campaign is not usually an effective
mechanism for persuading voters that a majority-approved policy will
in the long run undermine important goals of American democracy.
Enforcement of those protections is entrusted by the Constitution
to the "least dangerous branch" of government: "' a tribunal, insulated
68 See H. HART & A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1144-1241 (Tent. ed. 1958) ;
P. MISHKIN & C. MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS 318-513 (1965); Bishin, The Law
Fiuders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1965); Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630
(1958).
69 judicial authority to declare acts of Congress constitutionally unenforceable can
no longer be seriously doubted, if, indeed, it ever could. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION 21, 97, 108-10, 124, 13840 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) ; 2 id. at 73-80, 293-98,
391, 589; A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1-33 (1962) ; E. CORWIN, THE
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 41-45 (1914); H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE
FEDERA COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 14-16, 92-95 (1953) ; A. McLAUGHLIN,
THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND PARTIES 30-107 (1912); C. WARREN,
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 245, 248, 317-24 (1928); 1 C. WARREN, THE
SUpREM:E COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 206-65 (1922); Corwin, Marbury v.
Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review, 12 MICH. L. REV. 538 (1914) ; Rostow,
The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1952) ; Thayer,
The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L.
REV. 129 (1893); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Primiples of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. Rmv. 1, 2-9 (1959). But see C. BEARD & M. BRDa, THE RISE OF AMERICAN
CIVILIZATION 322-24 (1927); L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY 102-04
(1932); M. COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL 178-80, 182-85, 192 (1946); L. HAND,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 10-15 (1958).
7 0 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
71 A. BiCKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
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from direct political pressures, that has the power of neither purse,
sword, nor administrative control; with authority only to decide dis-
putes between contending parties; whose orders are dependent upon
executive enforcement; whose size is subject to legislative variation;
whose process of decision is reasoned analysis; and whose members
are restrained by a long-standing professional tradition.7 ' But these
restraints do not annul the extensive control over governmental
function implicit in judicial authority to enforce the Constitution and
to construe the scope of that authority. Coupled with natural law
limitations, such control concentrates in a nonelected elite sweeping
discretion to negate legislative policy.
The constitutional plan of written limitations confines the exercise
of judicial discretion to a frame of reference approved by the com-
munity. The divisiveness of majority-minority dispute is ameliorated
when resolution is based upon a declaration of values accepted as
authoritative by both groups. Constitutional decisions derived from
nonconstitutional values vitiate the cohesiveness engendered by the
Constitution as a symbol of shared purposes.73
Because the Supreme Court lacks both an .electoral constituency
and the power ultimately to enforce its own orders, acceptance of its
constitutional interpretations is dependent upon the respect accorded its
institutional position and the persuasiveness of the reasons given for its
decisions. 74  The traditional deference accorded the Constitution and
the Court as its interpreter may induce in a disagreeing or uncertain
majority at least tentative acceptance of controversial decisions that
rest upon constitutionally indicated values. (In the long run the
majority must be persuaded by discussion and experience that a par-
ticular constitutional interpretation preserves long-range community
goals. When the majority is not so persuaded, that interpretation is
likely to be eroded by inconsistent legislative and executive action and
72 The constitutional power of Congress to impose "exceptions and regulations"
upon the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (U.S. CoNsT. art. III, §2),
though frequently regarded as authorizing unlimited congressional control over that
jurisdiction, probably does not sanction congressional impairment of the essential con-
stitutional functions of the Court as the national tribunal of last resort: (1) to pre-
serve nationwide uniformity of federal law by resolving inconsistent or conflicting
interpretations by state and lower federal courts; (2) to maintain the supremacy of
federal law when it conflicts with state law or is challenged by state authority. See
Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1960).
73 Professor Lon Fuller's comment on the judicial process of common law de-
velopment is relevant to the judicial process of constitutional interpretation: "[l]t is
not the function of courts to create new aims for society or to impose on society new
basic directives" but rather to participate in "articulating the implications of [society's]
shared purposes."
Quoted in P. MISHKIN & C. MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS 102-03 (1965).
74See Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. Rzv.
193, 205-10 (1952).
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ultimately abandoned by the Court if not sooner changed by con-
stitutional amendment.) 75
But a court that asserts authority to designate the community
values that limit conduct-regulating policy is more likely to be viewed
as a constitution-making than a constitution-interpreting institution,
and its decisions are less likely to receive the deferential, tentative
acceptance of a disagreeing or uncertain majority so important to
effective testing of constitutional policy in the social arena. Conse-
quently, the decisions of such a court may tend to reflect current
majoritarian attitudes rather than long-range community goals.
THE JUDICIAL ROLE: LIMITATIONS ON
ENFORCEMENT POLICY
If due process limitations upon conduct-regulating authority
ought not to be derived from nonconstitutional values, perhaps due
process limitations on enforcement procedures may appropriately be
drawn from such sources.76 Enforcement procedures are institutional
mechanisms for resolving the public and private disputes that result
from noncompliance with conduct-regulating policy, uncertainty as to
the scope of that policy, and the difficulties of accurately perceiving,
recalling, and describing events. Such procedures include apprehension
of offenders, seizure of property, collection of evidence, and the conduct
of hearings to ascertain relevant events and appropriate policy. Though
sanctions and compensatory recovery are sometimes characterized as
"remedial" because their deterrent effect reinforces socially approved
behavior, they are encompassed by conduct-regulating policy, which
is ordinarily conceived and articulated in terms of such remedial
consequences.
Numerous limitations upon criminal enforcement procedures are
included in the Bill of Rights; 7 only three limitations upon non-
criminal enforcement procedures are specified: a jury trial is required
in suits at common law involving more than $20, judges are denied
authority to redetermine the facts after a jury trial,78 and unreasonable
searches and seizures are forbidden.79  These Bill of Rights limitations
7 5 See A. BicyEL, supra. note 71, at 24-26, 37-42, 258 (1962).
7 6 See note 5 supra.
77 See notes 94-103, 117-18 infra and accompanying text.
78 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
79 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The language of this limitation reaches official con-
duct in both criminal and non-criminal proceedings. See Able v. United States, 362
U.S. 217 (1960) ; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) ; cf. Federal Trade Comm'n
v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924). See also State ex rel. White v. Simp-
son, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N.W.2d 391 (1965) ; Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 255
N.Y.S.2d 83, 203 N.E.2d 481 (1964).
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constitute the primary source of constitutional restraints on federal
and state enforcement procedures.
The Supreme Court has not hesitated, however, to derive addi-
tional enforcement limitations from nonconstitutional sources. The
"sense of justice" test was applied in Rochin " to a situation which
could have been resolved by search and seizure and self-incrimination
values, later recognized as applicable to the states."' But the Court
has used a "fair trial" test to invalidate on due process grounds
enforcement-litigation procedures not proscribed by other constitu-
tional provisions. In criminal cases it has interdicted the knowing use
of false evidence by the prosecution,82 nondisclosure by the prosecution
of important admissible evidence tending to exculpate the accused,"3
"nonrational" presumptions tending to shift the risk of nonpersuasion
to the accused,"4 and trial by a judge with a financial or psychological
stake in the outcome.8 5 In noncriminal proceedings it has required
adequate notice, 6 a reasonable opportunity to be heard, 7 and a place of
trial with litigant contacts sufficient to "satisfy traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." "
The due process clause has an independent enforcement-limiting
function only if the constitutional plan supports judicial discretion to
derive at least some limitations on enforcement procedures, though none
on conduct-regulating policy, from nonconstitutional sources. The for-
8o Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
8' Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
82 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959);
Pyle v. Kansas, 318 U.S. 213 (1942) ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935);
cf. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
8 Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967) ; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
cf. cases cited note 82 supra.
84 United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) ; Tot v. United States, 319 U.S.
463 (1943) ; Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1933) ; cf. Gainey v. United States,
380 U.S. 63 (1964).
85 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (judge adjudicated contempt charge
based on defendant's conduct before same judge acting as a one-man grand jury);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (trial judge shared fine).
86 Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457
(1940); MacDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385
(1914) ; Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900).
87 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940) ; Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling
Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11
(1908). See also cases cited note 85 supra.
88 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); accord,
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; cf. Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Early cases identified procedural due process as "those settled usages and modes
of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration
of our ancestors and . . . acted on by them after the settlement of this country."
Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272
(1855). See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Kadish, supra note 28, at
321-26; cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523-24 (1927). See also Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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mulation of conduct-regulating policy is perhaps the most difficult, sen-
sitive, and encompassing of governmental functions. Ultimate formu-
lation of such policy, consistent with constitutional limitations, is
entrusted to the legislature. The conduct of litigation,8 9 on the other
hand, is clearly the special province of the judiciary. While the legis-
lature may participate in the fashioning of litigation policies, for the
most part they are a product of judicial experience. Procedural legis-
lation commonly ratifies that experience, or confirms the judicial rule-
making authority. Courts are particularly qualified not only to formu-
late policies for the efficient conduct of litigation but to perceive the
essentials of a fair trial,9" and the community is likely to accord sub-
stantial deference to that judicial expertise.The Constitution does not provide a comprehensive set of fair trial
limitations. The Bill of Rights catalogue of criminal trial protections
is extensive but incomplete.9 For noncriminal proceedings the specifi-
cations are rudimentary. 2 In this context, the linguistic, historical, and
functional connotations of due process of law 93 suggest that the clause
confers upon the courts authority to derive from the process of adjudi-
cation fair trial imperatives not otherwise indicated by the Constitution.
The function of adjudication is reconstruction of disputed events
and determination of dispute-resolving policy for the purpose of imple-
menting community values and minimizing social disruption. Fair trial
values maintain the integrity and efficiency of that process. Primarily,
they facilitate truth ascertainment, that is, accurate event reconstruction
and intelligent policy determination. But they also promote expeditious
and authoritative decision in order to conserve public and private re-
sources, reduce public and private anxiety, and heal sources of social
disaffection.
Bill of Rights restrictions on criminal litigation procedures imple-
ment for accused persons the following fair trial-truth ascertainment
values: notice sufficient to prepare a defense,94 a hearing before impar-
tial arbiters at a reasonably convenient place that is near the relevant
evidence and not subject to the control of the government,
9 5 an oppor-
n Litigation occurs not only in conventional courts but before administrative
agencies and perhaps before legislative committees as well.
9 0 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ; Kadish, supra note 29, at 321-26.
9 1 See text at notes 82-85 supra.
92 See text at notes 78-79, 86-88 supra.
93 See note 4 supra and accompanying text; note 88 supra; text accompanying
Inotes 89-90 upra.
94,. . . the accused shall . . . be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation • . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
95 ,,. . the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law ... V" .S. CONST. amend. VI.
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tunity to discover and present relevant evidence and to test adverse
evidence,9" exclusion of particularly unreliable evidence,"T effective pre-
sentation of the defense,"8 control of the defense,99 psychological support
and comfort,100 community surveillance and supervision of the criminal
litigation process,' 01 and preservation of the ability to contend with
superior government resources. 2 Expeditious-decision values are im-
plemented by inhibitions on delay and relitigation.'0 3
The judicially developed proscriptions on knowing use of false evi-
dence by the prosecution, nondisclosure by the prosecution of important
exculpatory evidence, and trial by a predisposed judge '" also preserve
for the accused the ability to discover and present evidence, to exclude
particularly unreliable evidence, to contend with superior government
resources, and to be heard by impartial arbiters. But the enumerated
requirements that reflect these values are too specific to reach the addi-
tional protections. 5 The implications of those values have been ex-
tended to the new protections by judicial appraisal of the adjudication
process, much as common law doctrine is extended by analogy through
judicial appraisal of community needs. And the unenumerated inhibi-
tion on shifting the burden of persuasion to the accused 106 reflects not
only the constitutional recognition of superior government resources
but also a judicially derived, independent truth ascertainment value that
minimizes for the accused the risk of adjudication mistakes
01
The jury trial and limited review requirements for noncriminal
litigation insure community supervision of the adjudication process. 08
96 ". . the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . .public trial, . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor; and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (emphasis added).
97 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI: confrontation of witnesses (hearsay protection) ; U.S.
CoNsT. amend. V: self-incrimination privilege (protection against coerced confessions).
98 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI: assistance of counsel.
o9 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: self-incrimination privilege (protection against prose-
cutor comment on failure of accused to testify, see note 281 infra); U.S. CoNsT.
amend. VI: compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.
100 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI: assistance of counsel.
1D1 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI: public trial (surveillance), by jury (supervision);
U.S. CONsT. amend. V: grand jury indictment (supervision).
102 U.S. CONsT. amend. V: self-incrimination privilege, double jeopardy; U.S.
CoNsT. amend. VI: assistance of counsel.
103 U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI: speedy trial; U.S. CONST. amend. V: double jeopardy.
104 See notes 82-83, 85 supra.
105 See notes 95-97, 102 supra.
106 See note 84 mupra.
107 See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1933). Perhaps this burden of proof
value is reflected by the self-incrimination inhibition against enforced examination of
the accused and against prosecutorial comment on failure of an accused to testify.
108 See notes 78 m.pra, 286 infra and accompanying text.
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Because the specified limitations are so few, most due process require-
ments for such litigation reflect fair trial values judicially derived from
the adjudication process and perhaps, by analogy, from constitutionally
specified criminal trial protections. Modern due process requirements
for judicial jurisdiction that reject the power-territory concept of Pen-
noyer v. Neff '09 are judicially derived from truth ascertainment and
expeditious decision values concerned with a place of litigation con-
venient to the parties 110 or economically accessible to an inconvenienced
party through use of the pricing mechanism to distribute litigation
costs; l a place where there is optimal access to the evidence; 11 where
disputed or attachable property can be immobilized and supervised; 11
109 95 U.S. 714 (1878). See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT or LAWS
(1834). The Pennoyer concept rested on the premise that persons and property lo-
cated on forum territory can be seized there at the outset of private litigation. Service
of process on a defendant within forum boundaries was viewed as the equivalent of
seizure, and international recognition of judgments thus obtained was considered neces-
sary to support the substitution of service for seizure. MacDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S.
90, 91 (1917); Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353, 356 (1913); see
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). This proposition was
distended into the generalization that only defendants served on forum territory or
otherwise subject to forum control could be personally subjected to forum judicial
authority. The generalization disregarded not only reciprocity values suggesting
collaborative development of mutually advantageous jurisdictional doctrine, but also
fair trial values suggesting that jurisdiction based solely on transient presence unfairly
disadvantages the defendant and that denial of jurisdiction over absent defendants
sometimes unfairly disadvantages the plaintiff. See text at notes 110-16 infra. The
impact of such values promptly distorted the concept. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1878) ; Sugg v. Thorton, 132 U.S. 524 (1889) ; Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry,
supra; MacDonald v. Mabee, supra; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Black-
mer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) ; Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623
(1935); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Milliken v. Meyers, 311 U.S. 457
(1940) ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra. Within the United States the
Pennoyer "power" premise is meaningless because no state has the physical power to
seize persons or property on its territory when such action is forbidden by the physically
dominant national authority. Power, thus, is not a relevant standard for constitu-
tional allocation of judicial authority among the states. It is a conclusion, not a reason,
and reduces the Pennoyer concept to a tautology.
110 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958).
111 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Liquid Carriers
Corp. v. American Marine Corp., 375 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1967); Deveny v. Rheem
Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) ; WSAZ Inc. v. Lyons, 254 F.2d 242 (6th Cir.
1958) ; Schutt v. Commercial Travellers Mut. Accid. Ass'n, 229 F.2d 158 (2d Cir.
1956) ; Continental Oil Co. v. Atwood & Morril Co., 265 F. Supp. 692 (D.Mont.
1967) ; Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 221 Ill.2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961) ; Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Co., 267 Minn. 56,
124 N.W.2d 824 (1963); Longines-Witnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc.,
15 N.Y.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68 (1965) ; cf. Hellriegel v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 7, 8 (N.D. Ill. 1957); O'Brien v. Comstock Food, Inc.,
123 Vt. 461, 194 A2d 568 (1963).
112 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) ; Fisher
Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 222, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1, 347 P.2d 1 (1959).
n 3 See North Carolina Land & Lumber Co. v. Boyer, 191 F. 552, 557 (6th Cir.
1911) ; Martin v. Better Taste Popcorn Co., 89 F. Supp. 754, 757 (S.D. Iowa 1950) ;
Beach v. Youngblood, 215 Iowa 979, 247 N.W. 545 (1933) ; Educational Studios, Inc.
v. James Cruze Productions, Inc., 112 N.J. Eq. 352, 164 A. 24 (1933).
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where multiplicity and relitigation will be minimized,114 set-offs facili-
tated," 5 child abduction discouraged,"' and harassment inhibited.
Constitutionally specified enforcement limitations also reflect
values concerned not with fair trials but with privacy intrusion, harass-
ment and brutality by overzealous or overbearing officials,"' and with
maintaining an informed community."' Fair trial values are not re-
flected by the unreasonable search and seizure protection. Exclusion of
evidence thus obtained subordinates effective truth ascertainment to the
privacy, antibrutality, and antiharassment values.1 ' The guarantees
of notice, confrontation and compulsory attendance of witnesses, and
assistance of counsel primarily reflect fair trial values. The other en-
forcement limitations reflect both kinds of values.
20
Enforcement limitations based upon other than fair trial values
are outstide the area of special judicial expertise. Their derivation
from nonconstitutional sources thus lacks constitutional justification.' 2'
This distinction is confirmed by the practice of the Court. Although
lip service continues to the Rochin "sense of justice" standard, 22 no
enforcement limitations have been judicially imposed that do not in
fact reflect either constitutionally indicated or fair trial values.
DUE PROCESS AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT:
THE SOCIAL PURPOSE LIMITATION
The function of the due process clause is circumscribed if it pro-
vides no independent standard for limiting the conduct-regulating
authority of government. The history of the clause, however, and the
"14 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950);
Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) ; Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Ass'n,
283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931); Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 222, 1
Cal. Rptr. 1, 347 P.2d 1 (1959) ; Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P2d
960 (1957). See also cases cited note 113 supra.
115 Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938); see Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220
(1946) ; Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal.2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955).116 See Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MicH. L. REv. 795 (1964)
Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody Problem: A Reply to
Professor Currie and a Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 183 (1964) ; cf.
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 548 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
l7 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV: unreasonable searches and seizures (privacy, harass-
ment, brutality); U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: self-incrimination privilege (privacy and
harassment: questioning without probable cause for arrest and constant questioning
after arrest; brutality: coerced confessions) ; U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: grand jury
indictment (harassment), speedy trial (harassment), double jeopardy (harassment)
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII: excessive bail (privacy, harassment, brutality).
11" U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI: public trial; cf. notes 96, 101 supra and accompanying
text.
119 See text accompanying note 312 infra.
INo See notes 96-99, 101-03, 117-18 supra and accompanying text.
121 See text accompanying notes 67-75 supra.
12 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760 (1966).
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pivotal position it has acquired as a constitutional regulator of official
power evidence tenacious judicial awareness of an underlying due
process value that protects the individual from overreaching govern-
mental regulation, And the admonition of the ninth amendment, that
rights other than those enumerated in the Constitution are retained by
the people, implies an independent, though inexplicit, limitation on
government, an implication reinforced by Madison's design to rebut any
inference that "those rights . . .not singled out [for enumeration in
the Constitution] were . . . assigned into the hands of the General
Government and were consequently insecure." '
Justice Black's assertion that the ninth amendment was adopted
"to limit the Federal Government to the powers granted expressly or
by necessary implication" 14 makes that amendment a repetition of the
tenth. The tenth amendment reserves to the states or the people the
"powers" not delegated to the federal government. The ninth amend-
ment is a reservation of "rights" by the people, not an allocation of
powers among governments. Like the preceding amendments, it is
concerned with limiting the exercise of the delegated federal powers,
not with their delegation.2 5
Nor does the language of the ninth amendment or the context of
its enactment indicate that it was designed as simply a canon of liberal
constitutional construction, a kind of necessary and proper clause say-
ing, in effect: The provisions of the foregoing amendments shall be
liberally construed to extend to those rights implied therein though not
expressly set forth. Madison would not likely have used the oblique
language of the amendment and of his congressional explanation to ex-
press that conventional legal idea. 26 The amendment does not incorpo-
123 1 ANNALS OF CoNmss 439 (1789).
124 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520 (Black, J., dissenting).
12 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-93 (1965) (Gold-
berg, J., concurring); B. PATTRmsoN, THE FORGOTrEN NINTa AMENDMENT (1955);
Kelsey, The Ninth Amendinent of the Federal Conistitution, 11 IND. L. REV. 309
(1936); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by the People", 37
N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 787, 802-06 (1962). See also United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 94-95 (1947); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118,
143-44 (1939) ; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 330-31 (1936).
126 The enacted amendment is less wordy than Madison's original draft, which
read:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of
particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance
of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated
by the Constitution; but [shall be construed] either as actual limitations of
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 435 (1789). See also Madison's general discussion of the
ambiguity of language in THE FEDERALIST No. 37 at 229 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) :
The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity, therefore, requires
not only that the ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they should be
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rate; it differentiates. Protection is extended not to rights implicitly
encompassed by those previously enumerated but to "others retained
by the people."
The amendment may appear to authorize limitations on federal
authority judicially derived from an inchoate reservoir of natural
rights, a reservoir that would also provide a likely source of fourteenth
amendment due process limitations on the states.2 But such a con-
struction confers upon the judiciary a carte blanche discretion, to desig-
nate limitations on the other branches of government, that is at variance
with the constitutional plan of written limitations interpreted and ap-
plied by the judiciary."" And the constitutional plan of judicially
enforceable restraints negates a view of the ninth amendment as no
more than a reassuring acknowledgment of residual, but judicially un-
enforceable, rights. Rather, the assertion of other rights "retained
by the people" suggests recognition of a limitation on federal authority
generally understood but not explicitly stated, perhaps because not
clearly articulated in the minds of drafters, Congress, and voters.
.The due process and residual rights concepts connote a basic
limitation upon governmental authority, derived from the function of
government and the official-citizen relationship. They imply that gov-
ernment may restrict human activity only for a socially useful purpose,
that every government regulation should implement some community
value..
This limitation sustains individual autonomy in choice of goals.
It preserves for each person optimal freedom to determine his needs
and the ways to fulfill them. It inhibits oppressive official conduct and
promotes community involvement in the formulation of policy. The
electoral process, being slow, inefficient for oppressed minorities, and
inappropriate for retroactive redress, is not alone an adequate mecha-
nism for preserving these values.
The social compact philosophy reflects this norm. The notion of
such a compact conceptualizes government as a product of communal
living, with the function of restraining individuals and allocating re-
sources for the common good. This concept, amplified by the Utili-
expressed by words distinctly and exclusively appropriated to them. But no
language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea,
or so correct as not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas.
Hence it must happen, that however accurately objects may he discriminated
in themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may be conceived,
the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate, by the inaccuracy of the
terms in which it is delivered.
and Chief Justice Marshall's extended discussion of express and implied powers in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
12 See authorities cited note 125 sitpra.
28 See text accompanying notes 11-13, 67-75 siupra.
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tarians,'" is reflected in the Declaration of Independence 130 and the
preamble to the Constitution. 3
In this light the language of the due process clause acquires more
definite coloration. The connotations of "life, liberty, or property" as ,
the totality of human activity and of "law" as policy formulated and
enforced by government to promote the general welfare convey the idea
that government may interfere with human activity only for a socially
useful purpose. And in this context the rights reserved in the ninth
amendment are the rights of individuals to act without inhibition by
governmental restrictions that accomplish no social purpose.
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE SOCIAL PURPOSE LIMITATION
The social purpose limitation was implicit in the traditional doc-
trine that state authority to regulate for the general welfare, called
"police power," could justify intrusion on activity otherwise accorded
due process protection.13' But police power, for the most part, was a
conclusion, not a standard of decision. The presence of a social benefit
did not insulate the regulation from successful due process attack.
Rather, the benefit became a counterpoise balanced against the detri-
ment resulting from impairment of natural law values. If the benefit
appeared to outweigh the detriment, the regulation was upheld as an
exercise of the police power. If the detriment seemed heavier, the
regulation was invalidated as beyond the police power. Police power
thus became a label that described the outcome of the balance, a balance
likely to be resolved by judicial attitudes concerning the wisdom of the
regulation when substantial and essentially nonquantifiable values were
on both sides of the scale.'33
a29 See generally D. BAUMIGARIyr, BENTHAM AND THE ETnics OF TODAY 23-79
(1952); J. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT oN GOVERNMENT (F. MoNTAGuE ed. 1891);
J. S. MI.L, CONsm.ATioxs ON REPRmSENTATIV GOVERNMENT (3d ed. 1865); J. S.
MILL, UTrAR- Amsm (2d ed. 1864); J. P.AmENTz, THE ENGL SH UTILITARPNS
(1949).
130. . . That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these
ends [Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness], it is the Right of the People to
alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely
to effect their Safety and Happiness . .
131 'We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, pro-
mote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
13 2 See cases cited notes 16, 18 supra, and 136 infra; Brown, Due Process of Law,
Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARv. L. REv. 943, 952-53 (1927) ; Kales,
"Due Process", The Inarticulate Major Premise and the Adamson Act, 26 YALE L.J.
519, 521 (1917).
133 See cases cited notes 16, 18 supra, and 136 infra; Brown, supra note 132, at
956-67; Corwin, Social Planning Under the Constitution, 26 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 1, 17
(1932) ; Cushman, The Social and Economic Interpretations of the Constitution, 20
MicH. L. REv. 737, 758 (1922) ; Kales, supra note 132, at 520; cf. Lerner, The Su-
preme Court and American Capitalism, 42 YALE L.J. 668 (1933).
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The general right to make a contract in relation to his busi-
ness is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the
14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution,
said the Supreme Court in Lochner v. New York.'- 4
[T]he question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable,
and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is
it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference
with the right of the individual to his personal liberty . . . ?
There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the
liberty of person or the right of free contract, by determining
the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker. 35
The Court later repudiated the Lochner result by discerning that
the benefits of maximum-hour regulation were, after all, heavier than
the resulting impairment of the due process-free enterprise value, 3 6 a
value that nevertheless remained for some time corpulent enough to
outweigh the social benefits of wage, price, yellow-dog contract, and
business licensing regulations.' When the constitutional shelter for
that value was finally removed,3 8 the balancing process was stultified.
The social benefits were left on one side of the scale, but with no im-
pairment of constitutional values on the other. Consequently, the Court
was compelled to focus more directly upon the nature of the due process
function. If contracting is entitled to no special constitutional protec-
tion, it is nevertheless an important human activity which should not be
subject to unlimited governmental restraint; any such restraint should
be for a socially useful purpose. Thus Chief Justice Hughes wrote for
the majority that sustained minimum wage laws for women in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish: 139
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It
speaks of liberty . . . . [T]he liberty safeguarded is liberty
in a social organization which requires the protection of law
against the evils which menace the . . . welfare of the people.
Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to
the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reason-
able in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interest of
the community is due process.
40
'34 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
35 Id. at 56-57.
136 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426
(1917).
137 See cases cited note 16 supra; W. LOcKxHART, Y. KAISAR & J. CHOp.ER, CON-
STrrUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTioNs 494-95 (2nd ed. 1967).
138 See cases and authorities cited note 19 supra.
139 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
1
40 Id. at 391.
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
But upon upholding state regulation of employment agency rates
in Olsen v. Nebraska 141 the Court seemed to cast aside all due process
restraint on economic regulation, including the social purpose limita-
tion, by declaring:
Respondents urge that ... there are no conditions which
the legislature might reasonably believe would redound to the
public injury unless corrected by such legislation.
We are not concerned, however, with the wisdom, need, or
appropriateness of the legislation . . . There is no necessity
for the state to demonstrate before us that evils persist
142
By this exuberant language, however, the Court may have intended no
more than to indicate that the state does not have the initial burden
of justifying its regulation, and that a legislative choice between de-
batable policies, each with an identifiable social purpose, should not be
judicially controverted. 43 The social purpose limitation was perhaps
suggested a few years earlier by the statement in United States v.
Carolene Products Co. 4 that legislation must rest "upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators," 145 and
acknowledged a few years later by the declaration in Daniels v. Family
Security Life Insurance Co.:
We cannot say that South Carolina is not entitled to call
the funeral insurance business an evil. Nor can we say that
the statute has no relation to the elimination of those evils.
There our inquiry must stop.146
More recently, in Goldblatt v. Hempstead," the Court, upon up-
holding an ordinance that prohibited excavations below the water table,
gave verbal support to the social purpose limitation by stating:
The ordinance . . . was passed as a safety measure ....
To evaluate its reasonableness we therefore need to know such
things as the nature of the menace against which it will pro-
tect [and] the availability and effectiveness of other less
drastic protective steps . 148
141313 U.S. 236 (1941).
142 Id. at 246 (Douglas, J.).
143 See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952).
144 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
145 Id. at 152.
146 336 U.S. 220 at 224 (1949). See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483, 487 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952);
Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-37
(1949).
147 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962).
148 Id. at 595.
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But the Court was reluctant to apply the limitation. Although unable
to think of a reason why the threat to public safety would be increased
by further excavation of gravel from a private lake already 25 feet
deep, 149 it nevertheless denied relief to the landowner partly because he
had failed to come forward with evidence showing that further exca-
vation would not increase the danger.'
The social purpose limitation is authoritatively recognized when
applied to invalidate a regulation. No economic legislation has been
judicially invalidated on due process grounds since 1937.51 Many
cases upholding challenged regulations contain language that appears
to acknowledge the limitation,15 2 'but due process invalidation of non-
economic controls has almost invariably rested on impairment of more
specific values derived from constitutional or nonconstitutional sources,
with failure to imnlement a social purpose sometimes providing auxili-
ary support.-
In Griswold, for example, four justices pointed out that the ban
on use of contraceptives by married persons to prevent conception but
not disease failed to implement the state's asserted goal of discouraging
marital infidelity.' 4 Yet these four, and the three others who voted to
invalidate, struggled to find impairment of a fundamental due process-
marital privacy value, dividing over whether that value could be derived
from the penumbra of specified constitutional protections, from unspe-
149 Id. See text accompanying note 265 infra. The purpose of the ordinance ap-
parently was to reduce the drowning hazard by inhibiting the creation of deep ponds
and lakes. Further deepening of a lake already 25 feet deep would not appear to
increase that hazard.
50 See note 288 infra, and text accompanying note 265 infra. The landowner
had complied with enclosure, berm, and slope requirements. The ordinance also re-
quired that such excavations be refilled, but the town apparently made no attempt to
impose that obligation on the landowner, perhaps because strong retroactivity values
would strengthen his claim to eminent domain compensation. The Supreme Court
denied the compensation claim because the landowner had presented no evidence that
the land's value was reduced by prohibition of further mining.
15, See W. LOcKHART, Y. KAmISAR & J. CHoPER, supra note 137, at 516;
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Re-
burial, 1962 Sup. CT. Rxv. 34, 38.
15 2 See cases cited notes 18, 136, 139, 144-47 supra.
153 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) ; cases cited notes 15, 25-29, 46
supra. Failure to implement a social purpose sometimes provided auxiliary support
for earlier invalidation of economic regulations. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905); cases cited note 16 supra; cases collected in Brown, supra note 132, at
944 nn. 8-10 (1927) ; cases collected in W. LOcKHIART, Y. KAmIsAR & J. CHOPER, supra
note 137, at 494-95; Bolling v. Sharpe, supra. See also Jay Burns Baking Co. v.
Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924), invalidating a bread weight regulation in part because
"the provision, that the average weights shall not exceed the maximums fixed, is not
necessary for the protection of purchasers against imposition and fraud by short weights
and is not calculated to effectuate that purpose . . . ." Id. at 517.
'54 381 U.S. at 498 (Goldberg, Brennan, JJ. & Warren, C.J., concurring) ; 381
U.S. at 505-06 (White, J., concurring). The state did not, and could not in good
faith, assert a policy of population expansion; nor did it suggest a policy reflecting
religious disapproval of contraception. See text accompanying note 310 infra.
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cified residual ninth amendment rights, or from other nonconstitutional
sources.
The status of social purpose as a due process standard is thus un-
certain. The Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply it to economic
regulation; as a test of other than economic regulation it remains sub-
ordinate to the process of balancing rights derived from constitutional
and nonconstitutional sources against the social benefits of challenged
regulations.
THE NATURE OF SOCIAL PURPOSE
"Socially useful purpose" is a broad concept concerned with the
utility of ends and the efficiency of means.' 5 If courts accept as socially
useful only the goals they approve, the standard is simply another desig-
nation for judicially derived natural rights. 56 But application of the
social purpose limitation differs significantly from the process of per-
ceiving natural rights and balancing their impairment against social
benefits.
Regulatory purpose is ascertained by identifying the problems that
evoked the regulation and by disceriing its function in the network of
institutional controls. When applied to legislative regulation, the
process is called statutory interpretation. A similar process discloses
the purpose of executive or administrative regulations and of common
law rules interpreted in the context of judicial applications rather than
legislative history and administrative practice.' 57
A socially useful regulatory purpose is concerned with the fulfill-
ment of basic human needs, that is, with providing those personal requi-
sites regarded by almost the entire community as important to mean-
ingful existence. Identification of these needs on a high level of
generality does not involve a controversial value judgment. A broad
consensus recognizes such basic needs as food and drink, clean air,
protection from the elements, sexual enjoyment, good health, avoidance
of physical injury, relief from pain, release from anxiety, discharge of
156 There is, of course, no sharp distinction between ends and means. In the
inevitable hierarchy of values that underlies a system of order, ends are means to more
important ends. Social problems are resolved not by the choice first of ends and then
of means, but by the fashioning of an ends-means pattern. Tradition and experience
suggest the often-competing, tentative ends that serve as hypotheses for the testing of
means to resolve problems. Deficiencies in available means compel modification of the
tentative ends, and further testing until means are found that substantially implement
the modified ends. In this context, differentiation of regulatory goals and methods
is useful in applying the social purpose limitation.
156 See note 7 supra.
157 Application of the social purpose limitation does not compel a judicial choice
between tenable, alternative regulatory purposes. If either is consistent with the
limitation, the regulation should stand. State court identification of state regulatory
purpose is ordinarily authoritative when the case is reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court. Identification of state regulatory purpose by lower federal courts
may be necessary in cases originating there when the identification is not provided by
state decisions.
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aggression, comfort, entertainment, affection, companionship, commu-
nication, knowledge, esthetic expression, privacy, dignity, and activity.
Fulfillment of every need is not essential to individual survival,
though fulfillment of each has obvious survival value. Environmental
limitations produce competing needs as well as competition between
individuals to fulfill them. But social living does not compel diminu-
tion in the total need fulfillment of each individual to allow fulfillment
by others. Men live together because the needs of each are more ade-
quately fulfilled by communal living than by isolated existence. Ef-
fective social arrangements enhance that fulfillment.'
The values of a community are designs for optimal need fulfill-
ment. They accommodate or assign priorities to competing needs.
They are products of a social evolution that involves human adjustment
to environmental changes, elaboration of habits and conditioned re-
sponses, transmittal of traditions, and private and public discussion and
ordering.
Because the Darwinian process apparently winnows social as well
as physiological variations, the viability of a value probably depends
upon its relevance to the long-range survival of community members.
Such survival is generally recognized as a community imperative de-
spite the inclination of some and the ambivalence of many toward self-
destruction.'59  A community may willingly sacrifice a good many
individuals in war and other hazardous activity to preserve a particular
social structure for the others.' But that structure is usually preferred
because in the community's view it more effectively fulfills needs essen-
tial or important to long-range survival.
The values of a community are thus intermediate goals that emerge
from social competition and dispute. They are not ends divorced from
means but rather an amalgam of ends and means molded by the pres-
sure of available resources, reflected by linguistic usage, and discernible
in the pattern of solutions to specific problems. Though wide accept-
ance results from their verbalization on a level of ambiguous generality,
tension between them is inevitable in areas of particular application.'
61
Legislative enactment and judicial dispute-resolution are aspects
of the process of value evolution. The two institutions are engaged in
discerning and articulating the values relevant to the solution of social
problems, that is, in making policy. This policy-making function in-
158 See H. HART & A. SACHs, THE LEGAL PROCESS 111 (Tent. ed. 1958).
159 Rarely, a community may choose extinction over oppressive survival.
160 Most are willing to run the risk because the possibility of extinction for a
given individual is relatively small. Some willingly die to safeguard preferred values
for the survivors.
161 The sharply divergent policy initiated by revolution reflects not newly con-
structed values but emergent values disregarded by the previous government.
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volves an interstitial shaping of values within the contours carved by
long-term social forces, a shaping implicit in verbalization. Developing
values emerge from the accommodations and choices compelled by com-
peting, established values. The result is formulation of principles that
articulate the values as formulas for resolving broadly related problems,
and rules that increase predictability and administrative efficiency by
specifying solutions to more particularized problems. The legislative
formulations are usually in terms sufficiently general to reach an inde-
terminate number of variable, future situations, some anticipated, some
not, at the time of enactment; the judicial formulations are often in the
narrower terms appropriate to the resolution of specific disputes.
When legislative policy is unformulated or uncertain, judicial per-
ception of social needs and social structure discloses dispute-resolving
values, a perception that is necessarily a product of the experience and
attitudes of each judge. Judicially enforced limitations on government
are derived from values, concerning the relationship of government and
the individual, so important to the community that they are accorded
recognition in broadly phrased constitutional provisions. These values
are more significantly shaped by judicial delineation than values under-
lying specific statutory directives and less significantly shaped by such
delineation than unwritten dispute-resolving values. The constitutional
values are judicially identified, illuminated, and accommodated within
the framework provided by the textual, historical, and contemporary
functional context of the constitutional language.'
62
But judicial identification of nonconstitutional community values
is required to implement the due process-social purpose limitation,
which directs the court to measure regulatory purpose against such
values. The process, nevertheless, need not result in the "constitution-
alization" of judicially favored values. In executing this constitutional
function the court considers whether the purpose of the regulation is to
advance recognizable community values, values perhaps controversial
but accepted by a substantial portion of the community and not incon-
sistent with other constitutional provisions. If the purpose reflects such
values, the court considers whether they will be significantly imple-
mented by the regulatory method. Judicial concern is focused not on
"fundamental rights" but on legislative goals and methods of achieving
them.
The scope of the value judgment is limited. The court evaluates
not the comparative utility of competing policies, but the minimal utility
of the policy adopted. Despite the lumping together of natural justice
and social purpose by justice Black in Griswold,
6' the evaluation does
'L See text at first full paragraph following note 68 .rupra.
163 381 U.S. 479, 513; see text accompanying note 60 mipra.
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not involve a balancing of nonquantifiable fundamental rights and com-
munity benefits, with the scales likely to be tipped in favor of the judi-
cially preferred policy. A socially useful purpose is identified not by
totting up opposing weights, nor by perceiving that one side of the scale
has dropped below the point of equilibrium, but by discerning significant
community values on the side of the regulation.'
Appraisal of Regulatory Goals and Methods
In the identification of social purpose a broad deference is neces-
sarily accorded the legislative choice of goals 165 because the legislature
mirrors community attitudes and the accommodations that emerge from
the enacting process generally disclose community values. Such values
are missing only from regulations that contradict more specific consti-
tutional directives and from absurd or corrupt regulations that suggest
a malfunctioning of the regulatory process, such as a requirement that
every automobile carry a bumper sticker bearing the legend "Bumper
Sticker" 166 or that every resident wear a pin in the shape of a donkey,
adopted at the urging of a legislator with a large supply of such pins on
hand. And evidence of unusual social conditions might relate even
such outlandish regulations to a community value.
More significant is the judicial appraisal of regulatory method to
determine whether it implements the regulatory goal. 16 7 The legislative
choice of method need not be accorded the deference due the legislative
choice of goal, because conduct-regulating policy is not nullified by
judicial rejection of method. The Court is engaged not in negating
legislative purpose but in assisting the legislature to achieve its policy
within the constitutional framework. A legislature "advised" by the
judiciary that the selected method of regulation is ineffective remains
free to adopt a more effective method.
A method that does not significantly implement the social purpose
of the regulation, while unusual, is not so rare as a regulation that
lacks such a purpose. In Griswold, the four justices who questioned
the utility of the anticontraceptive regulation conceded that discourag-
1q4 Cf. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises,
80 HARv. L. REv. 986, 998 (1967).
165 The purpose of an administrative regulation must reflect the purpose of the
authorizing statute.
1
6 5 See MAD no. 112, July, 1967, inside cover.
167 The social benefit that a regulation is designed to achieve can usually be dif-
ferentiated from the techniques provided to achieve it. The purpose of a 65 mile per
hour speed limit is to inhibit accidents. Fast driving is not harmful, but accidents are,
and experience indicates that fast driving significantly increases their number. The
basic needs of pain and injury avoidance, on the one hand, and comfort, entertainment,
and communication, on the other, are accommodated by the value that very fast driving
should be discouraged to inhibit accidents. The method chosen by the legislature to
achieve that value is a specific speed limit of 65 miles per hour, a method that obvi-
ously implements the statutory goal.
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ing marital infidelity was an appropriate goal but pointed out that the
method of regulation (prohibiting use to avoid conception but not diF-
ease) did not significantly implement that goal. 8
An unenforceable regulation does not implement its purpose. Sus-
tained absence of significant enforcement in the presence of widespread
violation indicates a lack of community inclination or capacity to im-
plement the regulatory purpose by the regulatory method or, perhaps,
by any method. Such unenforceability can be judicially ascertained.
Poe v. Ullman ' and Griswold disclose that for eighty years the Con-
necticut anticontraceptive regulation had been enforced only against
birth control clinics ... and a few "proprietors" who had been "picked
up" on the streets."' Marital infidelity is not discouraged by such
selective enforcement. Justice White, concurring in Griswold, pointed
to the obvious deterrent impotence of a ban on contraceptive use in
the presence of "total nonenforcement . . . and apparent non-
enforceability." 172
Rationality as a Test of Social Purpose
The Supreme Court has indicated that almost total deference is
due a "rational" legislative choice of the goals and methods of economic
regulation.' Rationality is probably an alternative verbalization of
168 See note 154 supra. As Justice White stated:
• . . the statute is said to serve the State's policy against . . .illicit sexual
relationships .. . .
Without taking issue with the premise that the fear of conception oper-
ates as a deterrent to such relationships in addition to the criminal proscrip-
tions . . ., I wholly fail to see how the ban on the use of contraceptives by
married couples in any way reinforces the State's ban on illicit sexual rela-
tionships . . . . [T]he sale of contraceptives to prevent disease is plainly
legal under Connecticut law.
381 U.S. at 505 (White, J., concurring).
In these circumstances one is rather hard pressed to explain how the ban
on use by married persons in any way prevents use of such devices by persons
engaging in illicit sexual relations . . . . Perhaps the theory is that the
flat ban on use prevents married people from possessing contraceptives and
without the ready availability of such devices for use in the marital relation-
ship, there will be no or less temptation to use them in extramarital ones. This
reasoning rests on the premise that married people will comply with the ban
in regard to their marital relationship . . .but will not comply with
criminal statutes prohibiting extra marital affairs and the anti-use statute
in respect to illicit sexual relationships ...
Id. at 506; see also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761,
782-83 (1945).
169 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
170AId. at 501-02; 381 U.S. at 505-06 (White, J., concurring).
171 367 U.S. at 512-13 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
172 381 U.S. at 506. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 502: "The undeviating
policy [of nonenforcement] throughout all the long years . . . bespeaks more than
prosecutorial paralysis"; A. BIcKEr., supra note 71, at 152-56.
'73 Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1944) and cases
cited therein; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938) ;
South Carolina Hwy. Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 191-92 (1938); see
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HAIv. L. REv. 129, 143-44 (1893).
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the social purpose limitation,1 74 but the connotations are misleading.
No legislature lacks sanity..7 5  Professor Alexander Bickel has sug-
gested that an irrational decision is one made under the stress of
"heightened emotion." 17 But emotion is an inseparable component of
all decision making, whether emotion refers to subconscious attitudes
formed by earlier experiences or to the impact of endocrine secretions
triggered by exciting or disturbing stimuli.
If an immediate response to those stimuli is irrational because it
occurs without deliberate consideration of consequences and alterna-
tives, such precipitate action is precluded by the process of legislative
enactment, which involves introduction, committee evaluation, discus-
sion, and vote in two houses, followed by executive review. Legis-
lators may respond zealously to disturbing events or popular outcry,
but zeal is not inconsistent with the legislative function 177 nor can its
legitimacy be measured by the adrenalin level of the zealots. The con-
stitutional issue concerns the consequences of enacted policy, not the
personal feelings of the legislators.
An irrational response is manifestly inappropriate to the stimulus,
and emotional responses are not manifestly inappropriate per se. Irra-
tional legislation is manifestly inappropriate legislation, and legislation
that serves no socially useful purpose is manifestly inappropriate. In
this sense regulations lacking social purpose or effective method are
irrational. But that characterization serves no socially useful purpose.
Appraisal of Particular Applications
Particular regulatory applications that do not implement the
regulatory goal lack social purpose. The drowning prevention pur-
pose of the Hempstead excavation ordinance, for example, was not
significantly implemented by application of the ordinance to inhibit
further deepening of Goldblatt's pond, already 25 feet deep, although
application of the ordinance to inhibit deepening of shallow ponds would
implement that purpose.'
Due process restrictions on choice of law also illustrate this
function of the social purpose limitation. The Supreme Court has
17 4 See M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 115-18
(T. Parsons ed. 1947); Solomon, "This New Fetish for Indigency", Justice and
!poverty in an Affluent Society, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 248, 260 (1966) ; Note, A Trial
Judge's Freedom and Responsibility in Administering Probation, 71 YAIE LJ. 551,
553 (1962).
175 See THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE-SELECTED PAPERS OF FEIx S. CoHENa 44 (L.
Cohen ed. 1960).
176 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 41 (1962).
177 Cf. A. BICEEL, supra note 176, at 39-41.
17
8 See notes 147-50 supra and accompanying text. Substantial deepening of
shallow ponds would significantly increase the drowning hazard.
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indicated that the due process clause permits the application of a forum
dispute-resolving rule, rather than the rule of another state connected
with the dispute through parties, events, or property, only when the
forum has an "interest" in that application.17' By implication a forum
may not apply the rule of any state that lacks an interest.' A state has
such an interest when application of its rule implements the purpose
of the rule.' 8 '
Thus, when an injured plaintiff seeks recovery from a bar owner
for excessive sale of drinks to the injury-causing driver, any forum
should apply a liability rule of the state where the bar is located and
the owner resides rather than a nonliability rule of the state where
the accident occurred and plaintiff resides."' The bar state's purpose
of deterring excessive liquor sales to persons using its highways will
be implemented by the application of its rule; 183 the plaintiff state's
179 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179 (1964) ; Watson v. Employers Liability
Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313
(1943) ; see Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939), and Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955), speaking primarily in terms of
full faith and credit; ef. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission,
294 U.S. 532 (1935); Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965). See also
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2nd Cir. 1962) ; B. CURRIE, SE-
LECFED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188 (1963). As yet, however, no modern
Supreme Court case has precluded application of forum law on this ground. A suffi-
cient forum interest has been found in every such case presenting the issue. Cf. First
National Bank v. United Airlines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952) ; Hughes v. Fetter, 341
U.S. 609 (1951); Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586
(1947).
'
8 0 See cases cited note 179 mtpra; B. CuRuE, slpra note 179, at 196-97; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws 20 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1966). As yet,
no Supreme Court case has precluded application of non-forum law on this ground.
See Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933). The full faith and credit clause limits the
rejection, not the application, of non-forum law.
'
81 See cases cited note 179 mtpra; D. CAvERs, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS
98-102 (1965) ; B. CuRRIE, supra note 179.
182 Cf. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
"Dram Shop" statutes commonly impose a secondary liability upon the bar owner;
the negligent drunk driver is primarily liable but may lack sufficient insurance and
resources to pay the damages.
The judicial jurisdiction of the bar owner's state is obvious. The plaintiff's state
can exercise jurisdiction if the bar owner is served there, owns property located there,
carries insurance with a company that has headquarters and is subject to "direct
action" there, or generally appears in the action; and perhaps the bar owner can be
reached by a long-arm jurisdictional statute. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05
(Supp. 1967) ; MONT. R. Crv. PRO. 4B.
183 The drunk must, of course, drive on local roads to reach an adjacent state.
Each state ordinarily regulates to promote the welfare of the people who live or carry
on business within the state. Most tort rules reflect a policy of deterring anti-social
conduct in the state as well as a policy of loss allocation that provides security for
innocent injured residents. Deterrence is particularly significant when, as here, the
tortfeasor (bar owner) can effectively control the anti-social conduct. In the presence
of liability insurance, deterrence results from the impact of loss experience on premiums
and insurability, from the threat of a judgment in excess of the coverage, and from
the possible inconvenience and loss of working time that usually accompanies litigation.
In addition, litigation may trigger license suspension proceedings, particularly when
the accident is out-of-state and not likely otherwise to come to the attention of the
bar owner's state officials. The loss-allocation policy of the bar owner's state is not
implemented by application of its liability rule when the injured plaintiff resides in a
state with a nonliability rule,
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purpose of insulating local bar owners from an oppressive responsibility,
stimulating local economic activity, and perhaps holding down the
local price of drinks, will not be implemented by application of its rule.
The plaintiff-state rule reflects socially useful purposes and provides
a method (nonliability) that usually implements those purposes, but
they are not implemented by application of the rule to a suit against
a bar owner of another state. The social purpose limitation protects
a litigating party from adverse regulation by a state whose policy is
not thereby implemented.
THE LESS INTRUSIVE ALTERNATIVE COROLLARY
The due process-social purpose requirement is not necessarily
satisfied by every regulation that implements a socially _Useful purpose.
The implications of the requirement are broader. T f government
should restrict human activity only to implement a socially useful
purpose, government should restrict human activity no more than
necessary to implement that purpose, The intrusion should be minimal.
A greater restriction is not socially useful when a lesser one will do
the job. Regulatory and individual autonomy values are accom-
modated by the less intrusive, or less restrictive, alternative.
Like the basic social purpose limitation, this less intrusive alterna-
tive corollary has supported the invalidation of regulations found to
impair more specific values derived from constitutional or nonconsti-
tutional sources.'8 4 But the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
accept it as an independent due process limitation. 85
Judicial Recognition: Regulations Affecting Interstate Commerce
State health and safety regulations have been invalidated as ob-
structions to interstate commerce when less obstructive regulatory
methods were available. But the due process clause was rejected as a
basis for invalidation of such unnecessarily restrictive regulations
although their social purposes were vitiated by the alternatives. A city
ordinance forbidding the sale of milk produced beyond the twenty-five
mile radius of local inspection was invalidated in Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison "' because the regulatory purpose of insuring a pure
milk supply could be effectively implemented by the less restrictive
alternative of sending local inspectors, and charging the added costs,
184 See generally Brown, Due Process, Police Power, and the Supreme Court,
40 HARv. L. REv. 943, 952-56 (1927) ; Struve, The Less-Restrictive Alternative Prin-
ciple and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. RiEv. 1463 (1967) ; Wormuth & Mirkin,
The Doctrine of the Rearonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964).
185 Cf. Brown, supra note 184, at 956; Struve, spra note 184, at 1463; Wormuth
& Mirkin, supra note 184, at 296.
186 340 U.S. 349 (1951). The ordinance also excluded milk pasteurized more than
five miles from the city center. Cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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to out-of-state milk producers.13 7  That solution accommodated the
commerce clause-free market value and the local health value. But
the Court denied that the same considerations would invalidate the
ordinance on due process grounds, stating:
A different view, that the ordinance is valid simply because it
professes to be a health measure, would mean that the Com-
merce Clause of itself imposes no limitations on state action
other than those laid down by the Due Process Clause
188
Eight years later the Court invalidated an Illinois requirement
that trucks use special contour mudguards rather than the conven-
tional mudflaps permitted or required in forty-five states. 89 The
national interest in unimpeded truck movement" was found to out-
weigh the state safety interest because the evidence "conclusively"
showed that flaps intercept debris as effectively as contour guards. 9'
The less restrictive alternative," which could have resolved the case
alone, was perceived as no more than a reducing agent that made the
local benefits lighter than national commerce clause interests.
If there are alternative ways of solving a problem, we do not
sit to determine which of them is best suited to achieve a
valid state objective .
said the majority;
Unless we can conclude . . that "the total effect of the
law as a safety measure . . . is so slight . . . as not to
outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce
free from interferences . . ." we must uphold the statute. 93
Application of the due process limitation was dismissed with the
remark:
Local regulations which would pass muster under the Due
Process Clause might nonetheless fail to survive other chal-
lenges to constitutionality that bring the Supremacy Clause
into play [i.e., challenges based upon the federal interstate
commerce power].'9
187The Court also indicated another alternative: adoption of the Model Milk
Ordinance, approved by the Madison Health Commissioner, which allows production
state inspectors to certify compliance with importing state standards, subject to veri-
fication by the United States Public Health Service. 340 U.S. at 355-56.
188340 U.S. at 354; cf. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros.,
303 U.S. 177 (1938).
189 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
190 Because a nearby state reauired flaps, a truck could not operate in both states
without a costly and time-consuming change of equipment.
191 359 U.S. at 525.
192 A regulation permitting either contour guards or flaps is clearly less restrictive.
193 359 U.S. at 524.
194 Id. at 529.
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Judicial Recognition: Regulations Affecting Constitutionally
Sheltered Activity
Speech-limiting regulations have been invalidated because less
intrusive methods were available to implement the regulatory purpose,
but the rationale has been applied as an aspect of the speech protection,
not as an independent due process ground for invalidation.'95
Overbroad speech regulations are disapproved because they re-
strict constitutionally sheltered communication more than necessary to
implement their purpose.
Any abuses which loud-speakers create can be controlled by
narrowly drawn statutes [regulating decibels and the hours
and place of public discussion]
said a majority of five in Saia v. New York; 196
[w]hen a city allows an official to ban them in his uncon-
trolled discretion, it sanctions a device for suppression of free
communication of ideas.
Dismissal of public school teachers who fail to list annually every
organization to which they have belonged or regularly contributed
within five years inhibits "[in]any . . . relationships [that] could
have no possible bearing upon the teacher's occupational competency
or fitness," declared a similar majority in Shelton v. Tucker.
1
7
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means
for achieving the same basic purpose .... 19
The statute's comprehensive interference with associa-
tional freedom goes far beyond what might be justified
199
And welfare regulations that inhibit religious observance are in-
valid unless the state "demonstrate[s] that no alternative forms of
regulation would combat [the] abuses without infringing First Amend-
ment rights." 200
195 SWe Struve, supra note 184, at 1487; Wormuth & Mirkin, supra note 184, at
292, 296.
196 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) ; cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
197 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
'9 6 Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
199 364 U.S. at 490. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) ;
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) ; NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) ;
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
200 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Vague regulations, many restricting speech, have traditionally
been invalidated because they provide neither fair warning of pro-
scribed conduct nor an ascertainable standard of guilt for adjudicators,
or because free expression is inhibited by the resulting uncertainty.201
Although such invalidation connotes the availability of less intrusive
alternatives, 202 that rationale has not been explicitly articulated.
[A] statute which . . . forbids . . . the doing of an act
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion, violates the first essential of due process of law,
2 °3
the Court declared in 1926 and reiterated in 1961.' But men of
common intelligence can avoid areas of unclear as well as clear appli-
cation,20 5 and ambiguities can be clarified in declaratory and injunctive
actions. Vague regulations violate due process because the area of
uncertain regulatory application that inhibits permissible activity can
be reduced by a less restrictive formulation specifying in greater detail
the nature of the proscribed conduct. o0
The availability of less intrusive alternatives has also supported
the rejection of regulations perceived as impairing fundamental rights
derived from nonconstitutional sources. Invalidation of passport regu-
lations found to infringe the "right to travel" was supported in
Apetheker v. Secretary of State by the availability of a less intrusive
alternative that would relate passport revocation to unlawful travel
plans rather than to Communist Party membership. The Court ob-
served that "Congress has within its power 'less drastic' means of
achieving the congressional objective," 207 but emphasized that "free-
dom of travel is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of
free speech and association." 28
Assertions in Griswold by Justices Douglas and Goldberg that
marital fidelity could be safeguarded by a less sweeping regulation,
2 0 1 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) ; Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Cramp v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) ; A. BIcKEr, supra note 176, at 149-52; Freund,
The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REv. 533, 540 (1951); Note,
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75-76
(1960).
202 Vagueness may also obscure the social purpose of the regulation.
203 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See, Cline
v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927).
204 Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961).
205 See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (Holmes, J.) ; A. Bic=EL,
supra note 176, at 151; Note, supra note 201, at 69.
206 Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) ; A. Bxc=m, supra note 176,
at 149, 151; Freund, supra note 201, at 455; Note, .supra note 201, at 109.
207 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512 (1964); see text accom-
panying note 27 supra.
208 378 U.S. at 517.
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and Justice White's preference for a contraceptive ban limited to
illicit sexual relationships, appear in the context of opinions that
identify marital privacy as a fundamental due process right derived
from a Bill of Rights penumbra or from nonconstitutional sources." 9
But when the Court has perceived no infringement of speech or
other fundamental rights, the less intrusive alternative rationale has
not been applied. Summary expulsion of a civilian cook from a naval
plant on security grounds was upheld in Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy 1 because the expulsion denied no more than an "oppor-
tunity to work at one . . . military installation" and did not "bestow
a badge of disloyalty or infamy." 211 Notice of charges and a hearing
were not recognized as a less intrusive method of eliminating security
risks. 12
Judicial Recognition: Economic Regulations
The availability of a less intrusive alternative occasionally added
weight to the impairment of free enterprise values at a time when due
process was measured by the gravitational difference between such
impairment and the public benefits of regulation."' Thus, a ban on
private employment agencies was invalidated in Adams v. Tanner..4
with this observation:
Because abuses may . . . grow up in connection with this
business, is adequate reason for hedging it about by proper
regulations. But this is not enough to justify destruction
of one's right to follow a distinctly useful calling in an upright
way .... 15
But when benefits outweighed free enterprise impairment, less re-
strictive methods became irrelevant. In the same year corporate secu-
rities regulation was upheld with the comment:
It may be that there are better ways to meet the evils at
which the statute is directed and counsel have felt it in-
209 381 U.S. at 485, 499.
210 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
211 Id. at 898.
212 Cf. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558 (1956) (fifth
amendment self-incrimination values reflected by decision that due process was denied
state college professor dismissed without hearing after invoking self-incrimination
privilege) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring)
(perhaps accepting the less intrusive alternative rationale as an independent due
process standard).
213 See Brown, supra note 184, at 954-56; cf. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137
(1894) ; Struve, supra note 184, at 1464; Wormuth & Mirkin, supra note 184, at 263-67.
214 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
215 Id. at 594. Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and Clarke dissented. See also Liggett
Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
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cumbent upon them to suggest a better way. We can only
reply that it is not our function to decide between measures
and upon a comparision of their utility and adequacy deter-
mine their legality. 16
The availability of a less intrusive alternative was perhaps the
sole ground for decision in Weaver v. Palmer Brothers Co.217  A ban
on bedding manufactured from used material was there invalidated be-
cause health hazards and deception were precludable by low cost
sterilization and labeling. The Court nevertheless referred to consti-
tutional protection of "property rights" and emphasized that bedding
materials are "useful articles . .. to be distinguished from things that
the State is deemed to have power to suppress as inherently
dangerous." 218
The Weaver bud did not bloom. Most of the later economic due
process cases ignore the less intrusive alternative, and some appear to
reject the concept by almost total deference to the legislative choice
of method as well as purpose 19 Exclusion from interstate commerce
of evaporated skim milk enriched with vegetable oil and vitamins,
2 6 Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 589 (1917).
217270 U.S. 402 (1926). Without articulating the principle, Jay Burns Baking
Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) may also have rested solely upon the availability of
a less intrusive alternative. The Court there invalidated a requirement that commer-
cial bread loaves not exceed by more than two ounces prescribed minimum weights,
because compliance was difficult unless the bread was wrapped to control evaporation;
unwrapped bread was in strong demand; purchasers would not likely take an inter-
mediate weight loaf for a heavier loaf [I], and "short weights readily could have
been dealt with in a direct and effective way." Id. at 516-17. Justice Brandeis, dis-
senting, demonstrated that the excess weight limitation was necessary for effective
administration of an anti-short-weight policy. Id. at 520-27.
218 Id. at 412-13. Justice Holmes, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone, dissented
because:
The Legislature may have been of the opinion . . . that the actual
practice of filling comfortables with unsterilized shoddy . . . was wide
spread . . . . It is admitted to be impossible to distinguish the innocent
from the infected product in any practicable way, when it is made up into
comfortables . . . . If the legislature regarded the danger as very great
and inspection and tagging as inadequate remedies . . .in order to prevent
the spread of disease it constitutionally could forbid any use of shoddy for
bedding . . ."
Id. at 415. But the dissenters did not mention the low cost of sterilization nor acknowl-
edge that the difficulty of detecting enclosed, used material indicates the need for effec-
tive, pre-enclosure inspection to inhibit evasion of either regulation. See text accom-
panying note 241 infra. This dissent reflects a preference for judicial deference to
legislative methods over judicial appraisal of alternatives. See also Adams v. Tanner,
244 U.S. 590, 599-600 (1916) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes & Clarke, JJ., dissent-
ing) ; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1937).
219 See Struve, supra note 184; Wormuth and Mirkin, .upra note 184, at 266;
Hetherington, suPra note 19, at 23-28. But see Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins.
Co., 336 U.S. 220, 225 (1949), distinguishing Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105
(1928), on the ground that "[tihe Pennsylvania statute [in Liggett] was clearly less
adapted to the recognized evil than the provision now before us."
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admittedly as nutritious as whole milk, was upheld in Carolene
Products Co. v. United Stateso as a congressionally designed pro-
tection against possible consumer deception despite truthful labeling.
Weaver was distinguished on the ground that "[s]terilization, in-
spection and labeling were [there] deemed to be sufficient to negative
the possibilities of . . . evils." "' Yet no consideration was given to
a less intrusive requirement that containers have a distinctive size,
shape, and color, with emphatic labeling, perhaps in several lan-
guages 22 Instead, the congressional choice of method was considered
unassailable if "rational." 2 3
A state requirement that all employees be given four hours off
with pay to vote was upheld in Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri 
2 4
because:
220 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
The process of manufacture consists of taking natural whole milk, ex-
tracting the butterfat content and then adding cottonseed or cocoanut oil and
fish liver oil, which latter oil contains vitamins A and D. The process includes
pasteurization of the milk, evaporation, homogenization of the mixture and
sterilization. The compound is sold under various trade names in cans of the
same size and shape as those used for evaporated milk. The contents of the
can are practically indistinguishable by the buying public from evaporated
whole milk, but the cans are truthfully labelled to show the trade names and
the ingredients.
Id. at 20-21.
Cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1937) (involving
evaporated skim milk not enriched with vitamins); Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297
(1919).
221323 U.S. at 29.
222 By contrast, a state proscription on the retail sale of evaporated skim milk
was invalidated by the New York Court of Appeals expressly on the less intrusive
alternative ground, although the opinion refers to "the right to sell non-deleterious
substances." Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N.Y. 537, 132 N.E.2d 829
(1956). The court stated:
, the property of a citizen including his right to sell non deleterious
substances may not be taken from him without rhyme or reason ....
[A] wholesome and useful food product has by statute been excluded from
sale in this State. The ostensible legislative purpose was to see to it that
customers did not get evaporated skimmed milk. But plaintiff's labels plainly
said: "Evaporated Skimmed Milk." If more distinctive marking was thought
necessary, the Legislature could have demanded other kinds of labels or
special sizes, shapes or colors of containers.
Id. at 541, 132 N.E.2d at 830-31.
=3 323 U.S. at 31-32. Since fortified evaporated skim milk has the appearance,
taste, and nutrient value of evaporated milk, see note 220 supra, the antideception
values underlying the legislation must be concerned with education of consumers and
with protecting the psychological preference of some for "natural" milk. But the
Court seems to suggest that the legislation protects consumers from being persuaded
to buy an inferior product. "Although . . . filled milk compounds as enriched are
equally wholesome and nutritious as milk with the same content of calories and
vitamins," said Justice Reed, "they are artificial or manufactured foods which are
cheaper to produce than similar whole milk products." 323 U.S. at 23. In identifying
the evil, he quotes from the congressional committee report: "Filled milk is sold under
various trade names . . . . Storekeepers sell it with the statements that 'it takes
the place of milk,' 'just as good as condensed and much cheaper,' 'nothing better on
the market,' 'takes the place of condensed milk."' Id. at 23 n.6. The Court appears
to have been oblivious to the speech values impaired by legislative disapproval of
truthful communications.
24 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
[T]he state legislatures . . . may within extremely broad
limits control practices in the business-labor field, so long
as specific constitutional prohibitions are not violated
225
The present law . . . is designed to eliminate any
penalty for exercising the right of suffrage and to remove
a practical obstacle to getting out the vote.226
Ignored were such alternatives as later polling hours and a shorter
time-off period adequate for voting while en route to or from work.
The statement in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead that "we . . .
need to know such things as . . . the availability and effectiveness of
other less drastic protective steps [than application of the anti-
excavation ordinance to Goldblatt's deep pond]" 227 indicates the sig-
nificance of less intrusive alternatives; but no consideration was given
to enclosure, slope, and berm requirements, fully met by Goldblatt, as
an effective, less drastic method of reducing the drowning hazard.2 '
THE INDICIA OF LESS INTRUSIVE ALTERNATIVES
Courts can identify less intrusive methods by comparing the re-
strictiveness, effectiveness, and cost of a regulation and suggested
alternatives. But deference is due the legislative choice unless the
alternative clearly is less restrictive and within the same range of
effectiveness and cost.229 The legislative role is not usurped by such
an appraisal: the court does not reject legislative purposes but suggests
constitutionally appropriate ways to achieve them. Legislature and
judiciary are engaged in a cooperative undertaking to implement regu-
latory and due process values3
80
Legislators need not enact a judicially designated alternative or
abandon their goal. In response to the decision, they may develop a
different method or reaffirm the initial method if scrutiny of the
alternative reveals judicially unperceived deficiencies. But a carefully




=7 369 U.S. at 590. See notes 147-50 supra and accompanying text.
228The Court suggested that evidence of a few holes burrowed under the fence
indicated attractiveness and danger to children. 369 U.S. at 595. Yet that evidence
only pointed to the need for a sturdy enclosure to keep children away from the already
deep pond. See note 265 infra and accompanying text.2 29 See Struve, supra note 184, at 1471. See also A. BIcKEI., supra note 176;
Thayer, supra note 173, at 144.
230 Legislative history not infrequently discloses either no substantial considera-
tion of less intrusive alternatives and due process values, or a tacit reference of the
constitutional issue to the courts. And the absence of legislative histories obscures
the legislative process in most states.
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Restrictiveness
The comparative restrictiveness of a regulation and an alternative
usually presents a debatable issue, necessarily resolved by the adoption
of the regulation. An alternative that would shift the restraint from
one group to another-a proposed alternative freeway route, for
example-is seldom clearly less restrictive.
But alternative methods are often indisputably less restrictive when
tailored to fit more closely the regulatory goals. Truck movement
manifestly is impeded less by conventional mudflaps than by special
contour mudguards.2 ' Exclusion of nonlocal milk is manifestly more
restrictive than inspection and a small fee at the place of productionY 2
Required sterilization and labeling restrict less than proscription of
used bedding materials.'-" Specification of distinctive containers and
emphatic labeling restrict less than proscription of skim milk fortified
with vegetable fat.' 4 Payment of wages for two voting hours is less
restrictive than payment for four.2"5 A ban on the use of contraceptives
in illicit relationships is less restrictive than a proscription of all use
to avoid conception." °
Cost
The additional public cost of alternatives often is not a significant
issue. Nonlocal milk producers pay the added inspection costs. In-
spection is needed to exclude used or unsterilized material, deceptive
containers or deceptive contents, trucks without mudflaps or without
contour guards. Two hours off for voting is less expensive to the
community than four hours off.
An alternative that increases public cost implicitly imposes an
additional restraint on taxpayers or on those who would benefit from
a different allocation of the public funds. But a moderate increase in
public expense that does not substantially burden any individual may
be socially less restrictive than the assessment of heavy costs to a few
individuals who derive no particular advantage from the benefits of
the assessment. Longer polling hours are perhaps less restrictive than
voting-time payments, even if the polling cost exceeds the price rise
resulting from the payments, because full price recoupment is not
available to employers with out-of-state or mechanized competitors."
7
2 31 See notes 190, 192; text accompanying notes 189-94 supra.
232 See text accompanying notes 186-88 supra.
= See text accompanying notes 217-18 supra.
2 34 See text accompanying notes 220-23 supra.
2,M See text accompanying notes 224-25 supra.
236 See text accompanying notes 46-66, 154, 168-72, 209 supra.
=87 See text accompanying notes 325-31 infra.
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Constitutional recognition of increased public cost as a less intrusive
alternative is implicit in the requirement of the eminent domain clause
that compensation be paid when antiretroactivity and tax-equality
values are significantly impaired by a regulatory assessment.238
Effectiveness
Effectiveness suggests a precarious appraisal of causation; yet the
effectiveness of alternatives is often clear. Mudflaps were "incontro-
vertibly" shown to be as effective as concur guards." The effective-
ness of nonlocal milk inspection was not challenged." ° Justice Holmes,
dissenting in Weaver v. Palmer Brothers Co.,241 avoided an appraisal of
effectiveness by deferring to the ostensible legislative conclusion that
sterilization requirements and inspection would not effectively elim-
inate dirty, used material, which is difficult to detect when enclosed.
But effective, pre-enclosure inspection is just as necessary to enforce
a ban on all used material as to enforce a ban on dirty used material.
And the low sterilization cost, referred to by the majority,242 suggests
that unsterile bedding would be more effectively eliminated by re-
quired sterilization and inspection than by total proscription of in-
expensive used material.
Deference was accorded the "rational" legislative ban on fortified
evaporated skim milk in Carolene Products Co. v. United States be-
cause "the compounds lend themselves readily to substitution for or
confusion with milk products." m Yet consumers preferring the more
expensive evaporated whole milk could be effectively protected from
deception by distinctive containers and emphatic labeling in several
languages. 24 4 And would not two hours off with pay eliminate employ-
ment obstacles to voting? 245
238 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. See text accompanying notes 325-31 infra; cf. text
accompanying notes 322-24 infra.
2 3 9 
See note 191 supra and accompanying text.
240 Nor was there any challenge to the effectiveness of the Model Milk Ordinance,
advocated as an alternative by the city health officer. See note 187 supra.
241 270 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1926) ; see note 218 supra.
242 270 U.S. 402, 411 (1926).
243 323 U.S. 18, 22-23 (1944).
244 See note 222 supra.
2 4 5 See text accompanying notes 224-26 supra. But the clear effectiveness of
longer polling hours can be ascertained only by a canvassing of the evidence.
In Goldblatt, the Court suggested no reason why a ban on further excavations
from a deep pond added to the effectiveness of the drowning protections provided by
enclosure, slope, and berm requirements. See notes 147-50, 228 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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By contrast, no clearly effective, less restrictive alternatives were
available to implement the purposes of employment agency, debt
adjuster, and right-to-work regulations." 0
A less restrictive alternative cannot be less effective than a regu-
lation shown to be substantially unenforceable.4 7  The Connecticut
contraceptive ban could scarcely implement its purpose less effectively
if limited to illicit sexual relationships, a limitation which Justice
White suggested "would serve the end posited by Connecticut . .
with the same effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, as the broad anti-use
statute . ... ," 2 And is a statute directly forbidding adultery and
fornication any less effective?
Non-Formal Alternatives
Less intrusive alternatives need not take the form of regulations.
A non-formal social mechanism may effectively implement the purpose
of a more restrictive governmental directive. The clear and imminent
danger requirement for speech-inhibiting regulation recognizes com-
munity discussion intervening between speech and action as an effec-
tive, less intrusive method of interdicting nonimminent harm.2 49  Re-
cently, two justices have suggested that reply by public officials in
the communications media is an effective defamation remedy less chill-
ing to speech than an action for damages.2 50
2 46 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Lincoln Federal Labor Union
v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) ; Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel.
Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
2 4 7 See text at notes 169-72 supra.
248 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (emphasis added).
249 That the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does not exist
unless speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent
danger of some substantive evil which the State constitutionally may seek to
prevent has been settled ....
Whitney v. California, 279 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
[T]he fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Id. at 375.
. .. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fal-
lacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied
is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repres-
sion.
Id. at 377.
See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.,
dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
This doctrine, when applied, has provided opportunities for testing the effectiveness
of community discussion as a non-formal alternative. See text accompanying notes
333-35 infra. See also note 250 infra (last paragraph).
250 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 304-05 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring, joined by Douglas, J.) :
The conclusion that the Constitution affords the citizen and the press an
absolute privilege for criticism of official conduct does not leave the public
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A combination of formal and non-formal social mechanisms prob-
ably provides a less intrusive alternative for implementing the social
policies that underlie restrictions on contraceptives, fornication and
adultery. The purpose of forbidding contraceptives is to inhibit
fornication and adultery.2' The purpose of forbidding fornication is
to inhibit illegitimacy, venereal disease, avoidance of marriage, and
adolescent emotional instability. But the incontrovertible lack of com-
munity inclination and capacity to enforce this pervasive restraint on
a physiological drive, and the consequent threat of selective, arbitrary
enforcement, suggest a clearly less restrictive and no less effective
alternative: easily available contraceptives and birth control informa-
tion, venereal-disease and sex education, counseling and public health
services, and the social pressure and psychological need to marry. An
additional purpose of the adultery proscription is to inhibit family
disruption, but the same incapacity for enforcement suggests that
widely-available marriage counseling is clearly less restrictive and no
less effective. 2
PROOF CONCERNING SOCIAL PURPOSE
Application of the social purpose limitation involves appraisal of
evidence concerning regulatory purpose, social need and social struc-
ture, and the physical and psychological responses that underlie
methodology. Such evidence is drawn from observed or recorded
community experience, and its sources include accumulated judicial
perceptions, as well as testimony, writings, and demonstrations. It is
frequently introduced at both the trial and the appellate level in the
form of argument suggesting inferences to be drawn from judicial
official without defenses against unsubstantiated opinions or deliberate mis-
statements. "Under our system of government, counter-argument and educa-
tion are the weapons available to expose these matters, not abridgement
• . . of free speech . . ." Wood v. Georgia [citation omitted]. The public
official certainly has equal if not greater access than most private citizens to
media of communication.
The majority perceived the first amendment as barring actions for nonmalicious,
but not for malicious, defamation of public officials, despite the speech-inhibiting effect
of both actions, and did not identify the opportunity to reply as a less intrusive alterna-
tive, available to counter either kind of defamation. See also Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964) (applying the same limitation to criminal prosecutions for defama-
tion of public officials). These decisions provide an opportunity for testing the effec-
tiveness of the non-formal alternative. See text accompanying notes 333-37 infra.
The presence of constitutional speech values permits a broader judicial appraisal
of less intrusive alternatives in these cases. See text at note 321 infra. They here
illustrate that non-formal social mechanisms may provide such alternatives.
251 See notes 154, 168 m.pra, and 310 infra, and accompanying text.
252 Premarital chastity and marital fidelity, per sese, are probably religious, not
social, values.
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observations and published writings. 53 Sometimes it is a product of
judicial research.25 Because "social facts" 255 describe community
mechanisms relevant to constitutional limitations, rather than disputed
events relevant to a single private controversy, their ascertainment
through litigation is the function not of an ad hoc jury or one trial
judge but of the judiciary and ultimately of the United States
Supreme Court.
The canvassing of such evidence is often labeled judicial notice,256
but the process involves more than recognition of incontrovertible
general information or identification of special presumptions and in-
ferences that allocate the burden of coming forward with contrary
evidence. 57
Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose
constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the
sphere of judicial notice, such facts may properly be made
the subject of judicial inquiry . . . and the constitutionality
of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state
of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those
facts have ceased to exist.
258
The questionable hearsay limitation upon evidentiary use of
learned treatises 2'59 has not been applied to exclude written evidence
=53 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497 (1961) ; Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) ; Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 485 (1952)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ; Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) ; Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) ; United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796,
802, 812-17 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ;
see also C. AuERBAcH, L. GARRISON, W. HEuus, & S. MERmIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS
91-137 (1961) and authorities there collected; M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCILz
ORDER 186-87 (1933); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960
Sup. CT. REv. 75; Bikle, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the
Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARv. L. Rxv. 6 (1924) ; Note,
Social and Economic Facts-Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them
to the Courts, 61 HAav. L. REV. 692 (1948).
254 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952); United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d
796, 801 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring), aff'd on other grounds, 354 U.S. 426
(1957) ; Note, supra note 253.
255See Note, supra note 253.
2589 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2555d (3d ed. 1940). See generally authorities
cited supra note 253.
2 5 7 
For general discussions of the function of judicial notice, see J. MAGUIE,
J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
8-84 (5th ed. 1965) (hereinafter cited as MAGUIRE]; C. McCoRasiCK, EVIDENCE 687-712
(1954); Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 CoLUr. L. REv. 945 (1955); MCCORMICK, Judicial
Notice, 5 VAND. L. REv. 296 (1952) ; Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARv. L. Rnv. 269
(1944).
25 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
259 Admission of learned treatises has increasing support See, e.g., Ruth v.
Fenchel, 21 N.J. 171, 121 A.2d 373 (1956); MAGUIRE 538-39; Dana, Admission of
Learned Treatises in Evidence, 1945 WIs. L. REv. 455; Uniform Rules of Evidence
63(31).
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of social facts relevant to constitutionality.260 The importance of cross-
examination hardly justifies exclusion of accumulated human knowl-
edge written down by persons not available to testify. If the adversely
affected party has notice of such evidence and an opportunity to reply,
the cogency of the statements and the competence of the authors may be
countered by argument, by contrary writings, and by the testimony of
experts.261 The possible infirmities of jury consideration are not
present in such judicial evaluation.
An inference of probable validity drawn from the fact of legis-
lative enactment requires the party attacking a regulation to produce
convincing evidence that the regulatory intrusion lacks social purpose.
To surmount the burden thus imposed by this "presumption of consti-
tutionality," the attacker must negate facts that would otherwise be
assumed in support of the regulation. 2
Such proof sometimes consists of a suggested inference drawn
from experience that the regulatory method will not implement the
regulatory purpose or that a less intrusive method is available. Such
an inference provided evidence in Griswold that marital infidelity is
not discouraged by a ban on the use of contraceptives to prevent
conception but not disease." The New York Court of Appeals re-
sponded to such an inference in Defiance Milk when it said:
Appellant argues that plaintiff failed to carry the burden of
proof. We do not agree. All plaintiff had to show was that
no reasonable basis existed for an absolute ban against
2 6 0 See authorities cited note 253 supra.
261 See Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REv.
1281, 1295-96 (1952); Note, supra note 253, at 697-98; cf. Currie, Appellate Court's
Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent In-
vestigation, 1960 Wis. L. Rnv. 39 (1960) ; Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evi-
dence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. Rsv. 364, 402-06 (1942).
Perhaps such notice and opportunity should also be given other persons and insti-
tutions significantly concerned with the validity of the regulation.
262 "[W]here the legislative judgment is drawn in question, [inquiry] must be
restricted to the issue whether any state of facts, either known or which could rea-
sonably be assumed affords support for it." United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 154 (1937) (emphasis added). See also Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959) ; Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954) ; South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 190-96 (1938) ;
Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934) ; Note, The Pre-
sumption of Constitutionality Reconsidered, 36 CoLUm. L. REv. 283 (1936). For the
significance of such a presumption, see note 303b infra.
For indications of a "narrower" or a contrary presumption when the regulation
apparently infringes Bill of Rights or first amendment values, see Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1940);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) ; United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Herndon v. Lowrey, 301 U.S. 242, 243-58
(1937); C. BLACx, THE PEOPLE AND THE CouRT, 217-21 (1960); McKay, The
Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182 (1959). But see Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 90-96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), whereirn reference to the
"preferred position" of the first amendment is disapproved.
263 See note 168 supra and accompanying text,
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evaporated skimmed milk. Since no one has been able to
discover any such basis, requisite proof of unconstitutionality
was present ... . 4
But in Goldblatt the Supreme Court did not perceive the evi-
dentiary value of a suggested inference drawn from experience that
further deepening of a pond already twenty-five feet deep would not
increase the drowning hazard. The Court denied relief to the land-
owner in part because he did not produce other evidence to support
that contention:
Although one could imagine that preventing further deepen-
ing of a pond already 25 feet deep would have de minimis
effect on public safety, we cannot say that such a conclusion
is compelled by facts of which we can take notice ....
Our past cases leave no doubt that appellants had the burden
on "reasonableness." 265
DUE PROCESS AS A TRANSPOSER OF CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has long
been the vehicle for extending to the states those Bill of Rights limita-
tions on federal authority considered fundamental.2 6 6  More recently
the state equal protection mandate of the fourteenth amendment has
been designated a fundamental safeguard implicit in the fifth amend-
ment due process limitation on federal authority. 6 7 The "funda-
mental" characterization supporting these transpositions is a natural
rights classification that creates an invidious distinction between con-
stitutional safeguards. The favored Bill of Rights provisions that
limit state authority are "principles of justice . . . rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people." 268 Equal protection values
restrain federal officials because "the concepts of equal protection and
due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are
264 Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N.Y. 537, 541-42, 132 N.E2d
829, 831 (1956). See note 222 supra.
265 369 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1962). See text accompanying notes 147-50, 227-28, 245
supra. Perhaps expert testimony on the issue would have been helpful, but the town
offered no evidence to counte the inference. The presence of equipment may have
constituted an added danger, but the Court made no reference to that possibility, and
apparently the town did not urge it. Under the circumstances, a remand to the state
court for consideration of the issue would not have been inappropriate.
266 See text accompanying notes 33-40 supra.
M Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) ; Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ; Detroit
Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 13-14
(1939) ; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937). See also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) ; Gibson
v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896).
2'8 Note 33 supra.
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not mutually exclusive." 29 A majority of the Court apparently is
unable to justify the transposition of restraints without resorting to
American traditions, conscience, and ideals.
Justice Black and a minority prefer fourteenth amendment absorp-
tion of the entire Bill of Rights to selective, natural law incorporation,
contending that total incorporation accords with the original under-
standing of the fourteenth amendment Congress."7 But the amend-
ment's ambiguous legislative history does not sustain their burden of
persuasionY.1  The recent cases that extend the due process category
to additional Bill of Rights limitations, suggesting a trend toward total
incorporation, rely on the fundamental character of the newly trans-
posed protections, not on the original understanding of the fourteenth
amendment enacters 2
Natural law sources are not needed to support the containment
of both federal and state authority by values underlying constitutional
restraints on each. Those values are relevant to enforcement of the
social purpose limitation. The recognizable community values that
constitute social purpose do not include values rejected by the Con-
stitution; constitutional values affect the choice of methods for imple-
menting social purpose.
Recognition that constitutional values are relevant to social pur-
pose does not imply automatic application to each government of
limitations on the other. Because federal and state institutional struc-
tures differ, the values underlying a restriction on one government are
not necessarily implemented by application of that restriction to both.
The nondesignated government need not be restricted by a limitation
designed to resolve a problem posed only by the functioning of the
designated government. The nondesignated government cannot dis-
regard underlying values relevant to its function but is not limited to
the constitutionally specified method of implementation when it can
implement those values in a different way.
Constitutional delineation of national governmental institutions,
amendment procedures, and nation-state jurisdiction reflects values that
269 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
270 Cases cited note 41 supra.
27, See J. TEN BROEI, THE AxTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FouRTZENTH AMEN-
MENT (1951); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendinent Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949) ; Graham The "Con-
spiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YAix L. J. 371 (1938) ; Kadish,
supra note 34, at 340-41; cf. 2 W. CROSSKEY, Politics and the Constitution, chs. XXXI,
XXXII (1953) ; H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AmENM ET (1908) ;
Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations
on State Authority, 22 U. CHl. L. REv. 1 (1954). See also Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954) ; Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segre-
gation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1953).
272 Cases cited note 38 supra; see note 40 sufra. See also notes 37, 39 supra.
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are concerned with efficient federal administration and with adjustment
of power between an encompassing national authority and its self-
reliant components, some once independent. Such values are not sig-
nificantly implemented by application of those constitutional specifica-
tions to internal state governmental structure. Values concerned with
effective popular participation in government, which also underlie those
specifications, are relevant to state governmental structure but are im-
plemented by the distinctive institutions of each state.2"
State compliance with the first amendment manifestly implements
the underlying values. Effective self-government and imaginative pri-
vate ordering are obstructed by state as well as federal disruption of
the "marketplace of ideas ;" 274 social divisiveness is engendered by fed-
eral or state propagation of religious doctrine." 5 State compliance also
clearly implements the values underlying the third amendment's ban on
uninvited, peacetime quartering of soldiers; the fourth amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures; the fifth amend-
ment's inhibition on compelled self-incrimination 276 and government
taking of property without compensation; 277 the sixth amendment's
guaranty to an accused of a speedy, public, impartial local trial, with
2 73 The popular participation values are also reflected by the republican form of
government and equal protection clauses (see the reapportionment cases collected in
W. LocKHART, Y. KAmISAR & J. CHoPER, supra note 137, at 116-35, 1371-1419), and
perhaps may be illuminated in those contexts by reference to the federal structural
provisions.
274 "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market. . . ." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Other speech values include preservation of nonviolent outlets for discontent, en-
couragement of esthetic expression, and protection for privacy of thought. The last
value is impaired by compelled transmission or reception of communications and by
interference with communications that the recipient finds interesting or enjoyable.
Justice Harlan has suggested that the first amendment speech protection limits
federal obscenity regulations more strictly than the fourteenth amendment limits state
obscenity regulations, not because application of that protection to the states imple-
ments speech values less effectively, but because federal "interest" in such regulation is
more "attenuated" than state interest, and because federal regulation has greater
impact. Therefore he would "balance" speech values and regulatory values differently
when determining the validity of federal and of state obscenity regulations. Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503-08 (1957) (dissenting opinion). This position per-
haps suggests that the federal interstate commerce and postal powers authorize federal
controls on mail content not to effectuate an independent federal obscenity policy but
only to protect each state from importation of materials proscribed by its laws. Com-
pare Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) ; Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470 (1917) ; United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420 (1919) ; Hoke v. United States,
227 U.S. 308 (1913) ; Lottery Cases, 188 U.S. 321 (1903), with Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311
(1917); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
2 7 5 See note 306 infra and accompanying text.
2
76See notes 97, 99, 102 supra and accompanying text; self-incrimination cases
cited note 38 supra.
2 7 7 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896); Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226 (1897).
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assistance of counsel, confrontation of witnesses, and their compulsory
attendance; 27 and the eighth amendment's proscription of excessive
bail and cruel and unusual punishments. Exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence in all courts deters privacy intrusion, harassment, and brutality
by the F.B.I. and local police. 9 Assistance of counsel is important to
a fair criminal trial before a federal or a state tribunal.8 A defendant's
control of his own defense, protected by the self-incrimination privilege,
is disrupted when his failure to testify is subject to comment by either
a federal or a state prosecutor. 8 '
Federal compliance with the state equal protection mandate mani-
festly implements the underlying even-handed treatment values. Dis-
content and violence, nonproductivity and erosion of self-esteem result
from badges of inferiority imposed upon a minority by state or federal
action.2 2  The restraint on state impairment of contractual obliga-
Concerning double jeopardy, see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). If
the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment precludes an appeal and retrial
in federal courts after acquittal of an accused (a limitation imposed by federal statutes
since 1789, see United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 434-36 (1960) ; United States v.
Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892) ; United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805) ;
18 U.S.C. §3731 (1964)), the same values are implemented by denying such authority
to state governments, namely, protection of the accused from harassment and superior
government resources, conservation of public and private resources, reduction of
public and private anxiety, and expeditious resolution of socially disturbing disputes
(see text following note 93 supra and text accompanying notes 102-03, 117 supra).
Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). But see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121 (1959) ; Hoag v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 464 (1958).
=8 See notes 94-102 supra and accompanying text.
2 7 9 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; text accompanying notes 117-19 supra.
2 8 0 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); text accompanying notes
98, 100, 102 supra.
2 8 1 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); text accompanying note 99
supra.
A person accused of crime may become confused and frightened under cross-
examination. His memory may be faulty with respect to unanticipated col-
lateral matters. He may be subject to impeachment for prior conviction of
felony [for commission of anti-social acts, or for poor reputation as to hon-
esty and veracity; his appearance may be displeasing]. Other aspects of his
behavior may be unfavorable if revealed. He is therefore accorded the right
to elect whether or not he will testify and to defer this election until after
the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against him.
Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 24
U. CHi. L. RFv. 472, 487-88 (1957). A defendant is inhibited from revealing most of
these reasons to the jury in explanation of his failure to testify. Prosecutorial com-
ment on such failure thus tends to deprive defendant of a meaningful election by
making either alternative strongly "prejudicial," that is, likely to be given undue weight
by the jury.
282 Equal protection values are concerned with avoidance of violent action by
disadvantaged minorities that necessarily lack an adequate electoral remedy or by a
disadvantaged majority that is denied effective electoral control; with elimination of
the obstacles to cooperative social activity that result from isolation of disadvantaged
minorities; with reduction of nonproductive and delinquent behavior through improved
living conditions for such groups, and with preservation of human dignity and self-
esteem through community recognition that need fulfillment is as important to each
individual as to every other individual. Equal protection values are perhaps implicit
1100 UNIVERSITY OP PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.116:1048
tions 2 8 reflects antiretroactivity values that are implemented by a
cognate federal limitation, and those values have been judicially recog-
nized as due process restraints on federal authority despite pronounce-
ments that the contract clause is not directed to national action. 84 In
fact, the antiretroactivity values reflected by the eminent domain, ex
post facto, and bill of attainder clauses, as well as by the impairment
of contracts clause, have long been identified as traditional due process
restraints on the authority of both federal and state government.2 85
But structural differences in federal and state judicial institutions
may enable the states to implement underlying values without conform-
ing to the fifth, sixth, and seventh amendment requirements of grand
jury indictment, jury trial, and limited review of jury fact-finding.
Those values are perhaps primarily concerned with preservation of
community supervision over an adjudicatory process administered by a
powerful national prosecutor and judiciary not directly responsible to
the community. 6 Federal judges are appointed by the President, hold
office during good behavior, and sometimes sit in cities distant from
the litigants. Early Circuit Court trial judges were often nonresidents
of the state of litigation, 87 as are court of appeals and Supreme Court
judges today. United States Attorneys, also appointed by the Presi-
dent and located in the large cities, are subordinate to the Attorney
General in the national capital. Grand jury rather than prosecutor
accusation and authoritative jury fact-finding inhibit domination of
in the due process-social purpose limitation because they are closely related to the
values underlying that limitation, because "equality" proscribes regulatory distinctions
that lack social purpose, and because classification is the essence of regulation. The
affirmative recognition of equality values in the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment confirms their fifth amendment due process application to federal
authority, whether or not equality is a special facet of social purpose.
283 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10: "No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impair-
ing the Obligation of Contract . .. ."
284 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 349-54 (1935) ; Lynch v. United States,
292 U.S. 571, 580-82 (1934) ; cf. FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958) ;
Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See Hale, The Sispreme Court and the Contract
Clause, 57 HARv. L. REv. pt. 3, 852, 890 (1944) :
. . . [T]here is at least a tendency for the contract clause and the due
process clause to coalesce. Although there is no clause expressly forbidding
the federal government to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts,
any federal law impairing them in a manner which the Supreme Court deemed
unreasonable would doubtless be held to be a deprivation of property without
due process, contrary to the Fifth Amendment.
28 5 See authorities cited notes 14, 284 supra.
286 Community surveillance and information values are implemented by the public
trial guarantee. See text at notes 101, 118 mupra. The values underlying the grand
jury and jury provisions are concerned with~ensuring fair trials; compelled public
participation in judicial decision-making is probably not an independent purpose.
287 See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL Sys-
TEm 42-47 (1953).
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criminal and civil law enforcement by such nonlocal and appointed
officials.
State trials, on the other hand, since before the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment have customarily been held in the vicinity of
the dispute before local judges who are elected for limited terms by that
community. 88 Resident state appellate judges, usually subject to
electoral review,28 9 are at least no further than the state capitol. Local
district attorneys with the power to accuse by information are also
elected. The community supervision values preserved in federal pro-
ceedings by the grand jury, jury, and limited review directives are thus
implemented in state proceedings by electoral surveillance of local judges
and prosecutors. 90 And the pretrial showing of probable cause im-
plicitly required by the grand jury indictment mandate reflects an anti-
harassment value that is usually implemented in state felony proceedings
by a preliminary hearing before an elected local magistrate.
The Supreme Court has recently concluded that the sixth amend-
ment's jury trial guarantee is a fourteenth amendment due process
limitation on state criminal procedures because "trial by jury in
[serious] criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of
justice."" But in identifying the purpose of the jury trial provision
the majority does not differentiate a judiciary permanently appointed
by a strong national executive from a judiciary subject to local electoral
surveillance. Support for the "fundamental" classification is largely
derived from historical antecedents that are relevant to trials conducted
by appointed rather than electorally supervised judges. Reference is
made to the "protection against arbitrary rule" provided by the jury
trial requirements of the English Bill of Rights; 292 yet that enactment
288 E. HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 80, 100 (1944) ; A. VAN-
DERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 16 (1955); Nelson, Variation on a
Theme-Selection and Tenure of Jvdges, 36 CALIF. L. REV. 4, 15-17 (1962). Most
state judges are initially appointed to fill a vacancy, and thereafter elected. In a few
states judges are selected by the governor from commission nominees, and periodically
stand for election on their records, without specified opponents. Id. at 41-43.
289 See note 288 supra and authorities there cited.290 See note 286 supra.
291 Duncan v. Louisiana, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1447 (1968), reversing a conviction for
simple assault (characterized as a serious rather than a petty offense because the
possible penalty was imprisonment for two years, although the actual sentence was
imprisonment for 60 days and a fine of $150) on the ground that the state constitutional
provision foreclosing a jury trial violated due process. Justices Black and Douglas
concurred on the ground that the fourteenth amendment incorporates the entire Bill
of Rights. Id. at 1454. Justice Fortas, concurring, could not agree "with the impli-
cation . . . that we automatically import [to the states] all of the ancillary rules
which have been or may hereafter be developed incidental to the right to jury trial in
the federal courts. . . . We may well conclude that [some] features of federal jury
practice are by no means fundamental-that they are not essential to due process of
law . . ." Id. at 1459-60. Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissenting, rejected in-
corporation of the sixth amendment by the fourteenth, and denied that the right to
jury trial in criminal cases is "an element of fundamental procedural fairness." Id. at
1467.
292 Id. at 1448.
1102 UNIVERSITY OP PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.116:1048
was concerned with safeguards against royally selected judges, as
indicated by the Court's quotation from Blackstone:
Our law has . . . placed . . . trial by jury between the
liberties of the people and the prerogative of the crown. It
was necessary . . . to vest the executive power of the laws
in the prince: and yet this power might be dangerous and
destructive . . . if exerted without check or control by
justices . . . occasionally named by the crown .... "'
"The first Continental Congress," recalls the Court, "objected to trials
before judges dependent upon the Crown alone for their salaries and
to trials in England for alleged crimes committed in the colonies." 294
"Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience
that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges
brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the
voice of higher authority." 29
The Court also suggests, however, that the jury trial option is
necessary to protect against biased, eccentric, or incompetent judges 
2 9 6
and perhaps to permit ad hoc departures from rigid or disfavored
rules 2 97---purposes relevant to trials before elected as well as perma-
nently appointed judges. Such litigation policies, though vigorously
challenged, are generally reflected by state jury trial provisions but do
not necessarily underlie the sixth amendment guarantee. The historical
context relied upon by the Court supports the view that the federal
constitutional purpose is community surveillance of a tenured, some-
times nonlocal, judiciary appointed by the executive-a purpose later
implemented in state trials by electoral supervision of local judges.-""
2 93 Id., quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *359-60.
294 88 S. Ct. at 1449.
295 Id. at 1451.
296 "Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave
him an inestimable sageguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the [compliant], biased, or eccentric judge. . . . [T]he jury trial provi-
sions . . . reflect . . . a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and
liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges." Id. at 1451.
297 "If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more
tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of a single judge, he was to have it."
Id. "The most recent and exhaustive study of the jury in criminal cases concluded
that . . . when juries differ with the result at which the judge would have arrived,
it is usually because they are serving some of the very purposes for which they were
created and for which they are now employed." Id. at 1451-52, citing H. KALvEN &
H. ZEISEL, THE AMERIcAN JuRY 4 n.2 (1966).
"A jury may, at times, afford a higher justice by refusing to enforce harsh laws
(although it necessarily does so haphazardly, raising the questions whether arbitrary
enforcement of harsh laws is better than total enforcement, and whether the jury
system is to be defended on the ground that jurors sometimes disobey their oaths)."
Id. at 1469 (Harlan, J., dissenting) citing ("See generally") G. WMIlAMs, TiE
PROOF oF GuILT 257-63 (1955) ; W. FORSYTH, HIsTORY OF TRIAL By JURY 261 (1872).
2 98 See notes 286-90 supra and accompanying text.
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If protection against inadequate judges and overly rigid application
of rules is a sixth amendment criminal jury value, it may well be a
seventh amendment civil jury value, unless vitiated by the less drastic
consequences of noncriminal proceedings. If such protection is not a
sixth amendment value, the Court may nevertheless evaluate the jury
trial option as essential to fair criminal trials apart from the sixth
amendment guarantee,299 an evaluation perhaps implicit in the Court's
characterization of the criminal jury right as fundamental. Such an
evaluation, strongly disputed by Justices Harlan and Stewart and by
many commentators,300 can more cogently be confined to criminal pro-
ceedings when based upon values not attributed to the sixth amendment
and therefore less attributable to the seventh.
Uncertainty over the original understanding of the fourteenth
amendment's enacters is not surprising."' The purpose of imposing
upon the states at least some Bill of Rights restrictions is suggested by
the legislative history as well as by the problems of federal-state author-
ity and state oppression of negroes to which the Amendment was
directed."'2 But the fourteenth amendment Congress did not undertake
to identify the constitutional goals that would be implemented by appli-
cation to the states of each Bill of Rights requirement. That issue has
remained for Supreme Court resolution.
SOCIAL PURPOSE AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES:
ACCOMMODATION AND SUBORDINATION OF REGULATORY GOALS
Identification of the values underlying constitutional language is a
process of creative integration reflecting judicial sensitivity to commu-
nity structure, needs, and attitudes. But the identification of relevant
constitutional values does not decide the constitutional issue. A rezula-
tion that inhibits to some extent constitutionally sheltered activity is
int net ef invalid. Constitutional limitations on zovernment do not
ahqnhlite1v nroscribe all reeu-ation that places tension on the underlying
values- Such limitations are not concisely delineated rules of official
behavior; they are generalized descriptions of sheltered areas-areas,
such as speech, too encompassing and too indistinct in contour to be
totally insulated from regulation that implements other important com-
2 99 See text accompanying notes 76-90, 104-16 supra, 350-52 infra.
30 0 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1467-70 (1968) (Harlan and Stewart,
JJ., dissenting).
Sol See notes 270-71 supra and accompanying text.
302 See authorities cited note 271 supra.
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munity values. 03 Despite the frequent assumption that a balancing
of constitutional and regulatory values is the only alternative to an
absolute constitutional standard,osa these values can be judicially
adjusted without the customary balancing that reflects either judicial
regulatory preferences or uncritical judicial deference to constitutionally
questionable legislative policy.
3 03b
Most regulation of sheltered activity implements community values
that are not constitutionally disapproved. A value is constitutionally
disapproved when its implementation stultifies implementation of a
constitutionally recognized value. If no method of accommodating the
two values is available, the former value lacks social purpose and is
necessarily subordinated to the latter. Regulatory and constitutional
values are accommodated by methods that substantially implement both.
Time, place, and decibel regulation of large public meetings mini-
mizes serious traffic obstruction and noisy intrusion on the privacy of
others. Traffic and privacy values are not disapproved by the Consti-
tution. Although communication is restricted to some extent, traffic,
privacy, and speech values are accommodated, because the ideas of the
participants can be effectively presented in a manner consistent with
such regulationO40 But a regulation forbidding expression of unpopular
303 Justice Black has been the chief judicial protagonist of the position that consti-
tutional limitations are "absolute." For support and criticism of that position see:
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 93, 96-97 (1962); C. Black, Mr. Justice
Black, the Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights, HARPER'S, Feb. 1961 at 63;
H. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960) ; Cahn, Mr. Justice Black
and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REy. 549
(1962) ; Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial Function, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
467 (1967) ; Kalven, Upon Re-reading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment,
14 U.C.L.A. L. Rar. 428 (1967). See also P. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE
CONSTITUTION 114-17 (1962); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GovE MENT (1948), reviewed, Chafee, 62 HARv. L. REV. 891 (1949) ; Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963);
Frantz, Is the First Amendment Lawf?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF.
L. REV. 729 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424
(1962); Mendelson, On The Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the
Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).
303aSee A. BicKEr, supra note 303, at 84-98; P. KAUPER, C. Black, Emerson,
Frantz, Mendelson, supra note 303; Karst, supra note 253.
303b See text accompanying notes 133, 141, 165-67 supra. The "preferred position"
sometimes accorded either the first amendment or the entire Bill of Rights primarily
constitutes a rebuttable presumption that infringing regulations are invalid. See note
262 supra and accompanying text; note 321 infra. This presumption at most allocates
to the regulatory proponent the burden of persuading the court that the social benefits
of the regulation strongly outweigh the detriment resulting from impairment of the
constitutional values, an allocation that is psychologically significant only when the
Court perceives the balance to be at or near equilibrium. The purpose of the preferred-
position presumption is apparently to encourage active judicial balancing, i.e., the
"constitutionalization" of judicial regulatory preferences, when a challenged regulation
affects civil liberties, political redress being difficult, while preserving restrained judi-
cial balancing, i.e. deference to legislative policy, when economic regulation is chal-
lenged. See C. BLACK, supra note 262; Frantz, supra note 303.
304 See cases cited note 196 supra.
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views, when no disorder threatens, is designed to insulate the commu-
nity from intellectually disturbing or distasteful communications and
possible emotional insecurity. That purpose stultifies first amendment
speech values; intellectual and emotional tranquility are necessarily sub-
ordinated to the effective self-government and imaginative private
ordering that result from uninhibited exchange of ideas3 5
The inclusion of prayers in a public school curriculum reflects
solely a religious instruction purpose that contradicts anti-establishment
of religion values, concerned with the social divisiveness engendered
by governmentally supported propagation of religious doctrine.306 Free
exercise of religion values are not significantly impaired by exclusion
of prayers as long as religious instruction is easily available at home
and in church30 But publicly financed transportation for students at
church-administered schools implements safety and educational values
that are not constitutionally disapproved30 Regulatory purpose and
anti-establishment values are accommodated because receipt of the non-
doctrinal transportation benefit by taxpaying believers and unbelievers
alike minimizes its social divisiveness as a religious aid.3 9
Failure of the regulatory method to implement the ostensible regu-
latory purpose often indicates that the true purpose of the regulation is
constitutionally disapproved. In Griswold the ineffectiveness of the
regulatory method to implement the ostensible regulatory purpose3 10
305 See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) ; Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951).
Regulations concerned with threatened disorder, insulting language, obscenity,
and defamation implement values that are not constitutionally disapproved; such regu-
lations must be appraised in terms of less intrusive alternatives. See text accompany-
ing notes 319-44 infra.
For other speech values see note 274 supra.
306 See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) ; Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). But see
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 'Compare Howe, The Constitutional Ques-
tion, in FUND FOR THE REPUBLIc, RELIGION AND THE FREE SociErY 49, 51-52, 55 (1958),
and Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1389 (1967), with Choper, Religion in. the Public Schools: A
Proposed Constitutiomal Standard, 47 MINN. L. REv. 329, 329-31 (1963). See also
Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme
Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REv. 167, 177 (1963) ; Kauper, Prayer,
Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1031, 1046, 1065-66 (1963);
Kurland, The Regents" Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury Signifying . . "
1962 Sup. CT. Ruv. 1, 30; Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARv. L.
REv. 25, 45 (1962).
:30 See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-99 (1963) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
0
08 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See also Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 88 S. Ct 1983 (1968).
30o9 Cf. authorities quoted in W. LocKHART, Y. KAmisA & J. CHOPER, supra note
137, at 1125-82.
310 See notes 154, 168, 172 supra and accompanying text
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suggests that the true purpose of the regulation was to identify as com-
munity policy a religious attitude of disapproval toward contraception,
a purpose that contradicts anti-establishment values.
Values that are constitutionally preferred for some purposes may
be constitutionally subordinated for others. Truth ascertainment values
underlie many of the enforcement procedures specified by the Bill of
Rights."' But the privacy, antiharassment, and antibrutality values
underlying the unreasonable search and seizure protection are stultified
by the use of improperly seized evidence to assist in truth ascertain-
ment. Until an effective way to implement both sets of values is
devised, those underlying the search and seizure directive are consti-
tutionally preferred in situations involving such proscribed official con-
duct. Although prosecutor comment on an accused's failure to testify
is designed to facilitate jury evaluation of the evidence, that truth as-
certainment goal is subordinated by the self-incrimination clause to a
truth ascertainment goal that preserves for the accused the control of
his defense."'3
Competing constitutional and nonconstitutional enforcement values
can often be accommodated. Exclusion of in-court identifications based
upon police-arranged pretrial confrontations that were not observed by
counsel accommodates both the constitutional, assistance of counsel-
truth ascertainment goal and the nonconstitutional, effective identifica-
tion-truth ascertainment goal.814 And use of compelled driver-intoxi-
cation tests 815 to facilitate truth ascertainment does not significantly
impair the privacy, antiharassment, and antibrutality values underlying
the search and seizure and self-incrimination protections when the tests
are performed by qualified personnel after probable cause for arrest.816
311 See notes 94-102 srupra and accompanying text.
3
1 2 See notes 117-19 supra and accompanying text.
:
81 See note 281 supra.
31 4 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
315 The test may be administered over the objection of the accused, Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), or may be compelled by driver's license suspension
for refusal to submit, specified as a condition to issuance of the license. See CAL.
VEHaICLE CODE § 13353 (West 1960). A choice of tests may be offered. Id. The fic-
tion that the imposed condition constitutes consent is needless.
316 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See also Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
The self-incrimination-truth ascertainment values that forbid compelled response
to police questioning (see notes 97, 102 supra) are not impaired by the use of physical
test results because: (1) the accused cannot be coerced, tricked, or induced to respond
with an untrue test result; (2) ambiguous or apparently damaging oral replies can
be explained by the accused at the trial only at the risk of character impeachment
(see note 281 supra); physical tests do not threaten such interference with con-
trol of the defense; (3) the prosecution, with its greater resources, is not given the
opportunity of tailoring its case to fit information first obtained by questioning the
accused (see note 102 supra). Perhaps, however, observation of the testing procedures
by counsel is indicated by the truth ascertainment values underlying the assistance of
counsel guaranty. See text at note 314 supra.
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A regulation lacks social purpose when constitutionally sheltered
activity is significantly restricted for a trivial, though constitutionally
permissible, purpose. As indicated by Justice Brandeis, constitutional
values cannot be reconciled with substantial regulation of the activities
they shelter unless the regulation is designed to avoid "serious," not
"trivial," harm.317  Judicial identification of trivial purpose and signifi-
cant restriction involves no more than an appraisal of small incon-
veniences and marginal restraints. For example, the slight impediment
to pedestrian movement caused by leaflet distribution is clearly not the
kind of social harm that may provide the occasion for significant speech
restriction. But a requirement of substantial space between distributors
to facilitate traffic flow does not significantly restrict communication
of the message." 8
CONSTITUTIONALLY PREFERRED AccO MODATIONS
,Constitutional values may be infringed no more than necessary to
implement a permissible regulatory purpose; 319 only the least infring-
ing method is socially useful.' Speech, for example, is infringed less by
time, place, and decibel regulation than by official discretion to grant
or withhold meeting permits, though both methods accommodate traffic,
privacy, and speech values.2 '
The affirmative recognition accorded sheltered activities gives them
constitutional precedence over residual activities shielded solely by the
due process-social purpose limitation. Accommodations that restrict
residual rather than sheltered activity are thus constitutionally pre-
ferred.2 This constitutional preference reduces the significance of
cost and probably broadens judicial discretion to evaluate effectiveness
when alternatives to sheltered-activity regulation are under consid-
eration.
3"1 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376-78 (1927) (concurring opinion).
:18 See Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) ; Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) ; cf. Adderley v. Florida 385 U.S. 39 (1966). But
see Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) ; Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52 (1942).
31 9 See notes 184-200 supra and accompanying text.
32 0 See notes 196, 304 mipra and accompanying text.
321 Compare references to the "preferred position" of the first amendment, or of
the Bill of Rights, that suggest: (1) a "narrower" presumption of constitutionality,
or a presumption of unconstitutionality, when a regulation apparently infringes such
provisions, see note 262 .upra; and (2) that first amendment values are more impor-
tant than other (or most other) constitutional values, and are therefore to be accorded
greater weight. See McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1182
(1959) ; cf. note 303b mspra and accompanying text.
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Community Payment of Regulatory Costs
Increased public expenditure, with its implicit restriction on resid-
ual activity, is often the constitutionally required alternative to a regu-
lation that significantly restrains sheltered activity.3 Speech and
public order values are better accommodated by additional police pro-
tection for unpopular speakers than by proscription of speech in the
presence of hostile listeners." And the assistance-of-counsel values
can be effectively implemented only by public expenditure to provide
lawyers for accused indigents.3 24  The cost of increased police protec-
tion and of counsel for indigents, though substantial, is constitutionally
less intrusive than significant impairment of the constitutional values.
Higher-cost alternatives to sheltered-activity regulation are sup-
ported by the fifth amendment inhibition on the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. The provision
reflects an antiretroactive deprivation value that encourages productive
behavior by augmenting the capacity of each person to benefit from his
own efforts and to plan for the future.3 25 It further reflects an equality
of taxation value concerned with even-handed assessment of govern-
mental and regulatory costs.3 26  When these values are impaired by a
322 Cf. text accompanying notes 237-38 supra, 328-31 infra.
323 See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) ; Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290, 294 (1951); Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877, 883 (8th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948) ; cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). But
cf. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942).
3 24 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
325 See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1210-13 (1967).
This value is also reflected by the contract impairment, ex post facto, and bill of at-
tainder clauses, and has long been implemented by the due process limitation. See
notes 14, 284-85 supra and accompanying text. In fact, every contract impairment case
implicitly presents a compensation clause issue, though judicial perception of that
integral relationship has been sporadic. See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S.
497, 533-35 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742
(1948) ; Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579-80 (1934) ; cf. FHA v. The Dar-
lington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958).
3 26 See Michelman, supra note 325, at 1176-80. See also Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YAIsE L.J. 36 (1964). For a statement of equality values see note
282 supra.
The graduated income tax does not impair this value if, on the one hand, the
quantum of basic fulfillment (see text following note 157 supra) forestalled by pay-
ment of each tax dollar diminishes at an accelerated rate as income increases and, on
the other, incentive to productivity inhibits governmental leveling of incomes. But see
W. BLUm & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PRoGREssIVE TAXATION 21 (1953).
In their book, Professors Blum and Kalven doubt the diminishing utility of money,
id. at 22-23, 57-60, a doubt that perhaps disturbs the case for proportionate taxation
as well. See id. at 23. But see id. at 42-45. Because the psychological deprivation
per tax dollar varies significantly with each taxpayer, rich or poor, no generalized
utility curve for money can be constructed. Yet an assumed equivalence of such
deprivation to the rich and not-so-rich implies that the psychological distress of a
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socially useful regulation, the clause indicates that community rather
than individual payment of regulatory costs is the less intrusive ac-
commodation3 2
The obligation of government to compensate for regulatory depri-
vation does not depend upon definitions of "property," "taking," and
"public use." The unruly events that pose social problems will not fit
mechanical, linguistic pigeonholes. 28  Nor is a "balancing" of private
detriment and public benefit meaningful in the absence of standards for
appraising the balance.329  Neither definitional nor balancing solutions
are workable unless they identify and implement the values underlying
the constitutional language.
$100,000 taxpayer is twenty times that of a $5,000 taxpayer, an implication that seems
contrary to experience. The satisfactions of ostentatious consumption are not sig-
nificantly affected by a progressive tax because social competitors are subject to the
same rates. Whatever the psychological distress of individual taxpayers, a probable
community consensus recognizes an inverse hierarchy of tax-dollar deprivations that
applies not only to income below some uncertain level of minimum subsistence, which
Professors Blum and Kalven concede should be tax exempt, id. at 90-91, but to the
entire progression of goods and services that accompany increasing wealth.
327See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799
(1950) ; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) ; Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v.
State Hwy. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613, 622-23 (1935) ; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236-37
(1897) ; cf. text accompanying notes 237-38, 322-24 sipra. But cf. Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) ; Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
328 As to the scope of "property," "taking," and "public use," compare [1] Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (compensation for prohibition of
coal mining producing surface subsidence) with Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)
(no compensation for destruction of ornamental cedar trees by official order to prevent
apple orchard infection with cedar rust) ; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (no
compensation for loss of brewery use pursuant to newly enacted prohibition statute) ;
[2] Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613 (1935) (com-
pensation for moving of pipelines to permit highway construction) with Atchi-
son, T.&S.F. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953); New Orleans Pub.
Service, Inc. v. New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682 (1930) (no compensation for compelled
elimination of railroad grade crossings on highways) ; [3] Griggs v. Allegheny County,
369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (compensation
for noise from directly overflying military and commercial planes using nearby mili-
tary and public service airports) with Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (no compensation for prospective zoning ordinance limiting land use); [4]
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (no compensation for zoning termina-
tion of existing industrial use as brickyard causing disturbance to recently developed
residential area) with state cases invalidating uncompensated termination by zoning
of existing nonconforming uses, collected in 1 A.L.R. 2d 931 (1965) (later case serv-
ice); 42 A.L.R. 2d 1150 (1955); 9 A.L.R. 2d 1039 (1952); 156 A.L.R. 588 (1945) ;
124 A.L.R. 538-40 (1940) ; 86 A.L.R. 684-88 (1933). See also Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954), indicating that "public use" is synonymous with social purpose.
3 29 See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUPM E CoURT REvmw 63, 73-80. "[C]ourts
have never been able to develop . . . a standard more meaningful than balancing the
public need against the private cost." Id. at 75. Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent
Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 596, 609 (1954) : ". . . only a dif-
ference in degree exists between noncompensable damage to a property owner under
the police power and a deprivation of property rights under the power of eminent
domain . . . . [T]o determine whether or not the line . . . has been crossed, the
extent of the diminution of the owner's rights must be weighed against the importance
of that diminution to the public." (Footnotes omitted?_
1968]
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Application of the compensation clause should turn upon: (a)
whether the assessed individual derives a commensurate benefit from
the regulatory assessment, (b) whether failure to compensate will
seriously disrupt private ordering: could the individual anticipate and
adjust for the assessment? were there prior indications of the assess-
ment-indications usually present when the assessed activity is a source
of harm? was the risk of such assessment an aspect of a speculation for
profit? can the assessed individual recoup from the community through
such economic mechanisms as pricing? and (c) whether compensation
is an effective alternative: will compensation defeat the regulatory pur-
pose? -3 will the added cost of administering compensation require
abandonment of the regulatory purpose as socially inefficient? 331
But a taking with compensation also restricts human activity and
infringes the due process-social purpose limitation when the regulatory
purpose lacks utility or can be implemented by a less intrusive method.3 2
The Testing of Probably Effective Alternatives
Evaluation of clear effectiveness M3 may require experience with
the functioning of an alternative, experience unobtainable while the
challenged regulation is in effect. When that regulation sharply re-
stricts constitutionally sheltered activity, a court may be justified in
setting it aside to permit the testing of a less intrusive alternative whose
effectiveness is considered probable.
An alternative regulation cannot be tested without cooperative
legislative enactment. Non-formal alternatives may function upon
330 Consider Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), sustaining
congressional authority to abrogate "payment in gold" clauses in private contracts,
and Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) finding no damage from abrogation
of such clauses in government bonds.
331 Compensation allocates but does not increase the social costs of regulation.
Administration is an added cost. See Michelman, supra note 325; cf. Sax, spra note
326, at 63:
The rule proposed here is that when economic loss is incurred as a result
of government enhancement of its resource position in its enterprise capacity,
then compensation is constitutionally required; it is that result which is to be
characterized as a taking. But losses, however severe, incurred as a conse-
quence of government acting merely in its arbitral capacity [improvement of
the public condition through resolution of conflict within the private sector
of society] are to be viewed as a noncompensable exercise of the police power.
The rationale is unclear as to why the compensation clause values are not relevant to
"losses, however severe," resulting from government acting "merely" to improve the
public condition by regulation of private activity. The distinction between the "enter-
prise" and "arbitral" functions of government does not appear to resolve effectively
the problems presented by the cases at note 328 supra.
332 Cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). For the older view that a taking
with compensation must be for a public "use," see Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164
U.S. 403, 417 (1896) ; cases collected in Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent
Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
33 3 See text accompanying notes 229-30, 239-48 mtpra.
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judicial displacement of the challenged regulation." 4 The ensuing ex-
perience with either a formally enacted or non-formal alternative can be
evaluated by both institutions. No further institutional action is re-
quired if the legislature views the alternative as effective. A later
reenactment of the initial regulation should be judicially reversed only
when the effectiveness of the alternative has been clearly established
by the intervening experience.
When applied, the clear and imminent danger requirement for
speech-inhibiting regulation 3 has facilitated appraisal of community
discussion intervening between speech and action as an effective method
of interdicting threatened harm. The recent preclusion of a judicial
remedy for nonmalicious defamation of public officials permits appraisal
of reply in the communications media as an effective, speech-protecting
alternative for alleviating such defamation. 3 The preclusion of re-
covery for malice as well, urged by three Justices, would permit an
appraisal of the reply alternative as a probably effective remedy for
all defamation of public officials. 37
A similar judicial approach to obscenity regulation could provide
the opportunity for community appraisal of less intrusive alternatives.
First amendment, privacy of thought values that shelter interesting and
enjoyable communications 838 are infringed by proscription of sexually
stimulating material, as they are infringed by proscription of material
that stimulates joy, sadness, and other emotions, or hunger, thirst, and
other drives. "Hard-core" pornography scarcely lacks social impor-
tance because it provides sexual gratification. 3 9 The social purpose of
334 See text accompanying notes 250-51 supra.
3
3
5See cases cited note 249 supra; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258-59
(1937); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 334 (1946); Craig v. Har-
ney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 445-53 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ;
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 259-89 (1961) (Black, Douglas, and Brennan,
J3., dissenting) ; Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) ; Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375, 388-89, 393 (1962).
33 6 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See note 250 supra.
337 376 U.S. at 296-97 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring) ; id. at 304-05 (Gold-
berg & Douglas, J3., concurring) ; see note 250 supra and accompanying text.
338 See note 274 supra.
339 See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 491-92 (1966) (Dogglas, J.,
dissenting); cf. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure"
v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) ; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195
(1964). But cf. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1966) ; Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ; Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 487
(1962) ; Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional Issue-
What Is Obscenef, 7 UTAH L. REv. 289, 296-97 (1961) ; Brief for Respondent, Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), cited in Lockhart & McClure, supra, at 295;
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banning material primarily designed to provide sexual gratification,
commonly labeled "obscene," is probably to inhibit incitement of anti-
social sexual conduct, to avoid mental distress resulting from involun-
tary exposure to such material, to reduce distortion in the sexual
education of children, and to preserve parental control over that educa-
tion3 40  The purpose of inhibiting impure or immoral thoughts is
constitutionally disapproved because it contradicts first amendment
privacy of thought and anti-establishment of religion values.34 1
Empirical studies have neither established nor negated a significant
correlation between harmful sexual conduct and voluntary adult expo-
sure to pornography.342 Substantial informed opinion suggests slight
correlation, because adult sexual inclinations are usually set, the ten-
sions that produce harmful acts are commonly released rather than
exacerbated by such exposure,43 and its impact is engulfed in a flood
of environmental sexual stimulants.
Restraint on the unsolicited display of obscene material and on its
distribution to children without parental consent, along with existing
criminal sanctions for harmful sexual conduct, is a less intrusive alter-
native. The effectiveness of that alternative could be better appraised
if proscription of voluntary adult exposure were invalidated by a court
Model Penal Code § 207.10, Comment 6(a), at 20 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1967). Denial
of social importance to the sexual gratification provided by hard-core pornography
seems to reflect, in part, a disapproval of masturbation. See Mishkin, supra; Roth,
supra; Manual Enterprises, supra; Lockhart & McClure, supra; Brief for Respondent,
supra. The desire of a recipient for some form of sexual gratification from the com-
munication is probably the only intelligible meaning of "prurient interest."
3 40 See J. PAUL & B. ScHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENsoRsHiP: OBScENITY IN THE MAIL
191-202 (1961) ; Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-
Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1009, 1034-36 (1962) ;
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 937
(1963) ; Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUm. L.
REv. 391 (1963) ; Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the
Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295, 323-33 (1954) ; Magrath, The Obscenity Cases:
Grapes of Roth, 1966 SUPREME COURT REViEW 7, 48-56; L. Schwartz, Morals Offenses
and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUm. L. Rxv. 669, 672-73, 681 (1963); Slough &
McAnany, Obscenity and Constitutional Freedomt--Part II, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 449,
472-77 (1964). See also 1 Z. CHAYEE, GOVER MENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 212
(1947).
341 See Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360
U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959) ; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 509-10 (1957) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting) ; id. at 507 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) ; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502, 505 (1952) ; Model Penal Code § 207.10(2), Comment 6(a),
at 20 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957) ; Henkin, supra note 340, at 392-95. But cf. Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).3 42 See Cairns, Paul & Wishner, supra note 340, at 1032-36; Magrath, supra
note 340.
3 43 See A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring) ; United States
v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 815-16 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring) ; Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 509 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Alpert, Judicial Censorship
of Obscene Literature, 52 HARv. L. REv. 40, 73-75 (1938); Murphy, The Value of
Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 655, 661 (1964). But see Memoirs v. Attorney
General, supra, at 452-53 (Clark, J., dissenting), and authorities there cited.
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that considered such proscription probably unnecessary to implement
the social purpose.3 44
Competing Constitutional Values
Competing constitutional values challenge a court to accommodate
both rather than subordinate the one that weighs less. Free press
values are implemented but impartial jury values are impaired by un-
inhibited pretrial publicity adverse to a criminal defendant. 4  Judi-
cially supervised postponement of such revelations until trial accom-
modates both sets of values, because public access to information is not
foreclosed but only delayed until the evidence is more reliably disclosed
to jurors and to the community by the litigation process.34" This ac-
commodation is perhaps indicated by the informed-community value
underlying the public trial guaranty of the sixth amendment.
Denial of unemployment compensation to persons who refuse suit-
able work is designed to limit the public cost of unemployment, encour-
age productivity, and preclude undeserving claims. Such denial also
interferes with the free exercise of religion by a claimant whose faith
forbids sabbath labor.347 An exception exclusively for Sunday sab-
batarians impairs both anti-establishment and free exercise values, while
minimizing regulatory infringement. An unrestricted choice by each
claimant of a day off impairs the regulatory purpose. An exception
for all good faith sabbatarians 348 preserves free exercise values and
344 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 484-h (McKinney 1965), as amended, id. §§ 235.20-.22
(McKinney 1967), declaring illegal the sale of obscene material, as there defined, to
persons under 17 years of age; Ginsberg v. New York, 88 S. Ct. 1274 (1968) ; The
Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 77, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947, 953, 218 N.E.2d
668, 672 (1966), appeal dismissed sub norn. Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385 U.S. 12
(1966). See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) ; Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
Cairns, Paul, & Wishner, supra note 340, at 1035, find no significant empirical
evidence that sexually stimulating material has a greater impact on adolescents than
on adults. Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 1281-82; Dibble, Obscenity: A State
Quarantine to Protect Children, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 345 (1966).
34 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-52 (1966); Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961); cf. AmEicAxBARASSOcIATION PROJECT ON MINI-
MUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMIN-lAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING To FAIr TRIAL AND
FREE PRESS (Tent Draft 1966); SPECIAL COMMrrTE oN RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE
ADmiNISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE ASsocIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw
YORK, FREEDoM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1967) (generally known as the
Medina Report); Forer, A Free Press and A Fair Trial, 39 A.B.A.J. 800, 843-44
(1953); Rifkind, When the Press Collides With Justice, 34 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 46,
47-48 (1950).
346 Change of venue may not sufficiently mitigate the harm, and numerous re-
versals seriously impair the administration of criminal justice.
347 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). But cf. Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599 (1961).
348 Good faith sabbatarians are persons whose religious beliefs proscribe labor
on their sabbath. Good faith is indicated by an established creed and practice.
See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 615 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part);
Giannella, supra note 306, at 1416-23.
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seriously impairs neither regulatory nor anti-establishment values; the
number of non-Sunday sabbatarians is small, and the effect of the
minor advantage they receive is protection of free worship rather than
propagation of religious doctrine.349
THE NATURAL LAW OF ADJUDICATION: JUDICIAL
DERIVATION OF DUE PROCESS-FAIR TRIAL VALUES
The judicial function of identifying constitutionally protected fair
trial values recapitulates the judicial process of statutory interpretation
and common law development. Constitutionally enumerated protec-
tions, like statutes, provide authoritative fair trial policy. The values
underlying those protections may be judicially extended, by analogy,
to support unenumerated protections, as the policy underlying a statute
may be judicially extended to situations beyond the reach of the statu-
tory language.350 Other judicially developed protections reflect fair
trial values derived from appraisal of the adjudication process, as com-
mon law policy reflects values derived from appraisal of the social
process.
Judicial authority to derive due process-fair trial values from the
adjudication process implies authority to evaluate the comparative
utility of adjudication procedures. Such procedures are either rejected
as irreconcilable with that process, subordinated to requirements having
greater adjudication utility, or accommodated with other necessary
requirements. Thus, ascertainment of guilt may sometimes be facili-
tated by placing the burden of persuasion on the accused, but such a
burden is judicially perceived as irreconcilable with a more important
truth ascertainment value that minimizes for the accused the risk of
adjudication mistakes."' And due process limitations on judicial
jurisdiction accommodate or "prioritize" the fair trial values relevant
to selection of an appropriate place for adjudication.
332
Accommodation of Fair Trial and Regulatory Values
Fair trial values must also be accommodated with the non-fair-
trial, regulatory values that are sometimes implemented or affected by
litigation procedures. Exclusion of privileged communications 3 5 3 from
evidence encourages certain relationships at the expense of truth ascer-
4) Cf. Giannella, supra note 306, at 1389; W. LOCKHtART, Y. KAmISAR, &
J. CHoPER, supra note 137, at 1182-86.
'350 See notes 76-93, 104-16 supra and accompanying text.
351 See notes 84, 107 supra and accompanying text.
352 See text accompanying notes 109-16 supra.
353 For example, husband-wife and doctor-patient communications.
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tainment. A forum non conveniens dismissal may result from calendar
congestion rather than litigant inconvenience.354 Although allocation
of judicial jurisdiction generally reflects fair place-of-trial objectives, 55
the exercise of such jurisdiction over a nonresident may permit reso-
lution of the dispute in accordance with forum rather than non-forum
policy.
856
The Supreme Court has moved toward an accommodation of fair
venue and regulatory values by acknowledging that forum interest in
the application of its policy is relevant to judicial jurisdiction.3 57 Usu-
ally that interest reinforces such place-of-trial values as convenience of
a litigant residing in the forum and optimal access to evidence of dis-
puted forum events.358 But when fair venue values do not support the
jurisdiction of an interested state, its regulatory policies may be
jeopardized. And when such values support adjudication in two or
more states, the regulatory policy may vary with the forum.
Venue and regulatory values may be accommodated in such situ-
ations by choice-of-law doctrine that distinguishes authentic from il-
lusory state regulatory interests359 and identifies the distinctive values
relevant to a choice between competing interests, as well as by per-
ceptive application of the constitutional controls on choice of law: the
due process-social purpose limitation that directs the forum to apply
the dispute-resolving policy of a state with an interest in that applica-
tion; 360 the equal protection values disapproving a distinction between
litigants that implements no socially useful purpose; 361 the privileges
and immunities-reciprocity value that disapproves dispute-resolving
distinctions based solely upon the fact of a difference in litigant resi-
dence; 362 the predictability-antiretroactivity values of the eminent do-
main, impairment of contracts, ex post facto, and bill of attainder
clauses that protect expectations and encourage useful activity; 33 and
354 See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); cf. First Nat'l Bank, Ex'r,
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609
(1951). Calendar congestion relates to public cost values.
3 5 5 See text accompanying notes 109-16 supra.
3 5 6 See text accompanying notes 179-83 supra.3 5 7 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) ; Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) ; Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S.
623 (1935) ; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274
U.S. 352 (1927). But see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
358 Cases cited note 357 supra.
3 5 9 See text accompanying notes 179-83 supra.
36 0 Id.3 6 1 See note 282 .rpra.
362 See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Blake v. McClung, 172
U.S. 239 (1898) ; Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discriination in the Conflict
of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 Yale L.J. 1323 (1960) ; cf. Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927).
3 6 3 See notes 14, 283-85 smpra and accompanying text,
1116 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.116:1048
the interstate respect and reciprocity values of the full faith and credit
directive that suggest an accommodation of competing state regulatory
interests when possible. 6
REPRISE: THE SOCIAL PURPOSE AND FAIR TRIAL FUNCTIONS
OF DUE PROCESS
A due process clause that confines governmental regulation to the
least intrusive methods of implementing recognizable community values
is consistent with a constitutional plan of written limitations, judicially
construed. The goal selection implicit in judicial balancing of regula-
tory benefits against impairment of natural law values departs from
the frame of reference established by the Constitution, weakens it as a
symbol of common goals, and inhibits the tentative acceptance of con-
stitutional decisions so important to their social evaluation. Rejection
of judicially disfavored legislative goals need not result from judicial
comparison of regulatory purpose with recognizable community values
nor from judicial appraisal of the restrictiveness, effectiveness, and cost
of formal and non-formal alternative methods. That process involves,
rather, a collaborative formulation of methods for accommodating
legislative goals with individual autonomy.
A due process-social purpose limitation integrates constitutional
restraints on federal and on state governments by transposing these
restraints when underlying values are thereby implemented. Those
values shape for both governments the contours of social purpose and
its implementation. But transposition of restraints is not automatic.
The values underlying a restraint on one government may not be rele-
vant to the institutional structure of the other or may be effectively
implemented by that structure in a different way.
Constitutional values negate the utility of regulatory purposes that
contradict them and of regulatory methods that unnecessarily impair
them to implement permissible purposes. A method that restricts
activity shielded solely by the due process-social purpose limitation
is a less intrusive accommodation of constitutional and regulatory
values than a method that restricts affirmatively sheltered activity.
Consequently, higher cost alternatives, with their implicit restriction on
residual activity, are often constitutionally preferred to regulation of
3 6 4 See Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965) ; Clay v. Sun Ins. Office,
Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Watson v. Em-
ployers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) ; First Natl Bank v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951) ; Industrial
Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947) ; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296
U.S. 268 (1935) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532
(1935) ; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
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sheltered activity-a preference supported by the compensation clause
of the fifth amendment; and judicial negation of sheltered activity
regulation may sometimes be appropriate to facilitate social testing of
probably effective, less intrusive alternatives. Competing constitutional
values call for an accommodation-not a subordination of the "lighter"
one.
Judicial litigation expertise and the linguistic, historical, and func-
tional connotations of "due process" support judicial authority to derive
from the adjudication process constitutionally unspecified fair trial
requisites reflecting truth ascertainment and expeditious decision values.
Bill of Rights procedures, like statutes, provide authoritative fair trial
policy that may be extended to nonspecified protections by analogy.
Further requirements are derived from the adjudication process as
common law is derived from community structure and needs.
But fair trial values must be accommodated with the constitution-
ally permissible non-fair-trial purposes implemented by some litigation
procedures. Thus, jurisdictional and choice-of-law doctrine ought to
accommodate fair place-of-trial values and the conduct-regulating
policies that may vary with the forum.
Constitutional values are not static. They evolve in response to
changing social conditions. Though "fewer and fewer relevantly de-
cisive choices are to be divined out of the tradition of our founding," 865
human needs and problems of social adjustment have not so radically
altered in 180 years that the constitutional verbalizations are obsolete.
Those verbalizations are continuously reviewed and reinterpreted by
judicial articulation and community evaluation of their dispute-resolv-
ing implications. Those verbalizations will continue to provide an
integrative, associational structure until they no longer suggest values
that are relevant to the demands of the physical and social environment.
8-A. BIcKEL supra note 176, at 39.
19681
